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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF RENT SEEKING
SEPTEMBER 2016
KURT VON SEEKAMM JR, B.S., TRINITY COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTES AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTES AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott
Chapter 1 of this dissertation focuses on the political economy of rent
seeking. Using trading in financial markets, patent litigation and managerial
privilege as descriptive examples from the modern economy, it identifies situations
where rent seeking opportunities occur. The challenge of correctly distinguishing
between productive activities and rent seeking activities demonstrate the empirical
challenges of examining rent seeking. This chapter also suggests that in addition to
the opportunity cost of physical capital, modern rent seeking has a significant
opportunity cost in the form of the misallocation of human capital.
Chapter 2 explores the relationship between increased rent seeking,
aggregate demand, and economic growth. A mature economy Post-Keynesian model
is developed to include the existence of economic rents. Two cases are explored. The
first assumes a fixed markup and a flexible rate of capacity utilization along the
balanced growth path. The second allows for a flexible markup and a fixed rate of
capacity utilization. In both cases, the existence of rent seeking has negative effects
on the long-run rate of low-skill employment and negative level effects through the
redistribution of high-skill workers.

v

Using IPEDS data on degree completions by field of study for the 48
contiguous states from 1990-2010, chapter 3 uses the composition of postsecondary
degree completions by major field of study as an indicator of the degree of rent
seeking. Increases in the level of rent seeking are shown to have negative effects on
the growth rate of real personal income per capita. A stylized growth model shows
how rent seeking regimes can explain the empirical results.
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PREFACE

Rent seeking is an important concept in economics, but it is also one of the
most poorly defined. Economics textbooks often mention rent seeking in the context
of lobbying the government. However, with dramatically increasing income
inequality, rents have begun to be referred to simply as “ill-gotten gains” (Bivens
and Mishel, 2013). Unfortunately, the former definition is far too narrow and the
latter definition is far too broad.
In writing this collection of essays, it was paramount to use a working
definition of rent seeking that was clear, conclusive, and general enough to be
relevant to macroeconomic modeling. Murphy et al (1991) develop such a
definition. When individuals rent seek, they argue, “their private returns come from
the redistribution of wealth from others and not from wealth creation.” The danger
of this type of rent seeking is that if the returns to rent seeking are higher than the
returns to creating wealth, individuals will be re-allocated away from activities that
directly contribute to the production of output.
Using this definition, it is clear that rent seeking includes activities that lie
outside of the public sector. Chapter 1 highlights some examples of rent seeking that
occur in financial markets as a result of deregulation and increased competition, in
patent creation and litigation as a result of regulation that is incomplete and poorly
designed, and within firms as a result of bureaucracy and imperfect contracts.
Although a far cry from a complete list of examples, these examples highlight the
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shortcomings of the definition of rent seeking often found in textbooks that suggest
government intervention is required for rent seeking to occur.
The working definition used for this manuscript points to the distribution of
income between types of agents as the mechanism by which to examine rent
seeking theoretically. However, standard economic models are often poorly suited
to examine changes in the income distribution and the models that are well
equipped to deal with these changes often have other serious shortcomings. In
chapter 2 these problems are dealt with by augmenting a mature economy PostKeynesian growth model to include rent seeking, a heterogeneous labor force, and
the production and distribution of workers who are able to be involved in rent
seeking activities.
In chapter 3, the empirical method employed by Murphy et al (1991) is used,
and expanded, to empirically analyze the effects of rent seeking on growth in The
United States. Using postsecondary degree completions by type as an indicator of
rent seeking, the finding that increased rent seeking leads to slower growth is
consistent with the findings of the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 2. Although
this finding is consistent with the model, it should be stressed that it is far from
conclusive as there is still more work to be done to properly measure the level of
rent seeking.
When reading this manuscript it is likely that you will be looking for villains,
and it is tempting to conclude that individuals who rent seek, or who are employed
by firms that rent seek, violate some sort of moral code. While some forms of rent
seeking are morally reprehensible, fraud and corruption for instance, other types of
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rent seeking occur as a result of the institutional structure of the economy with
which economic agents interact. So although this manuscript casts rent seeking as
“social bad”, the individual economic agents are not to blame. The structure of the
modern capitalist economy provides opportunities for introspectively wellintentioned economic agents to rent seek. It is paramount that the field of
economics does a better job of analyzing and making policy recommendations to
reduce the opportunities to and rewards of rent seeking.
As a final note, the essays contained within this manuscript are designed to
be stand-alone essays. Although an effort was made to keep repetition to a
minimum, some repetition was unavoidable.
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CHAPTER 1
“RENT SEEKING IN DEVELOPED ECONOMIES: FINANCE, PATENTS, AND
MANAGERIAL PRIVILEGE”

A. Introduction
This chapter highlights different forms of rent seeking in modern economies.
Contrary to what is taught in many economics textbooks, rent seeking does not
necessarily require the manipulation of government regulations. Instead, rent
seeking is prevalent throughout the economy and occurs between firms and
governments, among competing firms, and within firms. In fact, rent seeking
opportunities can develop as a result of government deregulation. Because rent
seeking is so widespread, the goal of this chapter is exceedingly modest, aiming to
provide some anecdotal evidence of rent seeking between different types of entities
and the social costs associated with it. This chapter does not aim to provide an
extensive list of all the different types of rent seeking.
Following Murphy et al. (1991), rent seeking is defined as any activity that
has private returns from a redistribution, rather than creation, of wealth. Rent
seeking activities have been observed throughout history, including in ancient
Rome, Medieval China, and during the Middle ages (Baumol, 1990). The cost of rent
seeking is its social waste. In some instances, it can simply be the amount of time an
individual spends rent seeking as opposed to producing output. However, many rent
seeking activities use additional resources beyond time, including both physical
capital and human capital. The costs of the latter could be especially high if the most
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attractive jobs available to the most talented individuals facilitate rent seeking
instead of economically productive activities.
Under the definition of rent seeking in this chapter, rent seeking activities
can be thought of as a contest of economic agents competing over an outcome that
does not result in the production of output. Instead, the economic agents use
resources to shift existing wealth or market power from one competitor to another.
The outcome of the contest is the rent, and it has some value, monetary or
otherwise, to the contest’s players. If a transfer of income takes place, the rent is
theoretically observable and is constituted by the transfer to the victor. However,
the size of the rent and the transfer of income are costly to society as a loss of
efficiency and may also cause an undesirable change in the income distribution.
Unfortunately, the additional costs to society from rent seeking are largely
unobservable to researchers. These unobserved costs are born in the form of
payments made by economic agents, be they firms, governments, politicians, or
individuals, in an attempt to secure available rents, in addition to opportunity costs
of physical and human capital. Even when there is not a transfer of wealth or power,
the total cost of rent seeking to society should include money spent by all
individuals, even when none of them receive any rents. These social costs are in
addition to the cost of the rent. If the rent were uncontested these additional costs of
competitive rent seeking would not be realized (Krueger, 1974).
It should be noted here that the social costs of rent seeking include both the
opportunity cost of capital, like building a fiber optic cable to carry trading
information, and the opportunity cost of human capital, like hiring engineering PhDs
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to design and trade financial derivatives. The costs of physical capital are fairly
straightforward to calculate, those resources are no longer available to use in the
production of another good. However, the opportunity cost of using human capital
to rent seek is incalculable as it is not clear how that individual would have used his
or her talents otherwise.
Often, opportunities to rent seek are considered a result of intervention by
government. Regulations that create opportunities to procure rents include tariffs
(Tullock, 1967) (Krueger, 1974), the regulation of monopolies (Baik, 1999),
preferential tax treatment, the issuing and defense of questionable patents, and any
other activity where the government is intervening in an otherwise efficient
marketplace. In this context, the primary consequence of the existence of rent
seeking is that it is an additional cost beyond the cost of the regulation.
The proposition that rent seeking exists inasmuch as the government
provides opportunities for it requires the government to have both the ability and
willingness to interfere in markets and redistribute income between parties
(Hillman, 2013). Because rent seeking is generally viewed unfavorably, societies
often look to implement further regulation as an attempt to curtail the amount of
rent seeking. This can lead to a “vicious circle” where an attempt to reduce the
amount of rent seeking may create more rent seeking opportunities (Krueger,
1974).
This chapter argues that, although governments do create opportunities to
rent seek through their ability and willingness to redistribute income1, private
1

Illustrated by the discussion of patents in section 3.
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agents are also capable of creating rents endogenously due to a lack of government
regulation or through the hierarchical organization of firms. In fact, in any market
where the conditions for perfect competition are not satisfied, firms and individuals
have incentives to fight over the spoils of the production process. Furthermore, even
when markets operate near the conditions of perfect competition, rent seeking can
still occur through wasteful innovation and resource allocation, as is the case in
modern financial markets.
When analyzing different types of rent seeking, it is important to keep in
mind that many individuals who facilitate rent seeking, such as lawyers or those
employed by financial institutions, are not necessarily the rent seekers themselves.
Many of them are employees of rent seeking firms, or contracted by them. In order
to not confuse the employee with the rent seekers (their employers), employees
hired to facilitate rent seeking will be referred to as facilitating labor. Firms and
individuals who organize and participate in rent seeking activities will be referred
to as rent seekers or rent seeking labor.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections B-D use the
existing literature on rent seeking to provide evidence that rent seeking takes place
in financial markets, the secondary patent market and patent licensing, and within
firms. Section E comments on the misallocation of human capital. The final section
concludes.

B. Finance: Trading on Speed
Secondary financial markets provide an interesting example of rent seeking.
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The activities of financial firms are functional in that they provide liquidity to
“investors” and a constant re-evaluation of investment decisions that, without a well
functioning financial market, would be non-existent. This constant re-evaluation of
businesses can increase the level of investment by making investments revocable
for the individual entrepreneur and decreasing risk.
On the other hand, the existence of well-functioning secondary financial
markets may reduce the level of investment. If a pre-established company can be
purchased at a lower price, it may diminish the incentives to create new companies.
In addition, secondary financial markets may lure workers with business acumen
away from starting their own business if they can instead buy and sell assets on
financial markets for immediate profit (Keynes, 1936). Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, even though secondary financial markets make an investment
revocable for the individual, the investment is not socially revocable as the
resources used to make it have already been used up.
The dual roles of secondary financial markets as incubators for new
investment and shufflers of pre-existing wealth highlight the difficulties of
distinguishing activities that play a functional role in the production process from
those that are purely rent seeking. In the first case, traders of financial assets
provide a service that is useful in the creation of new wealth. In the latter case, they
act as speculators that do not contribute to the production of new wealth, but rather
look to capitalize on the redistribution of wealth by transferring ownership of preexisting assets.
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In particular, professional speculators have transformed the role of financial
markets. Instead of applying their efforts to correctly evaluate the long-term
viability of investment projects, speculators look to foresee “changes in the
conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public (Keynes,
1936).” This effort to outpace the market is pure rent seeking that proponents
justify by citing improved pricing efficiency and increased liquidity. However, there
is evidence that the pursuit of pricing efficiency and liquidity has yielded handsome
profits to highly sophisticated speculators at the expense of functional market
makers and less sophisticated investors who cannot compete on the basis of speed.
Using speed for the purpose of increasing liquidity draws to our attention the
absurdity of the newfound role of professional speculators. Instead of facilitating the
goals of clients to generate future returns, professional speculators look to exploit
their comparative advantage by reducing their latency, or the amount of time it
takes to execute an electronic operation. Latency occurs as a result of a computer
needing time to process data and execute commands, and the amount of time it
takes data or commands to travel between computers and data centers at different
locations. When stocks are poised to fall, they use speed to ensure that they can
dump assets before the general public. When stocks are poised to rise, they use their
superior technology to purchase assets before the general public. This front running
of the market does increase pricing efficiency as it causes assets to be priced faster,
but it does so at the expense of ordinary investors whose actions would have led the
market to same price, even in the absence of sophisticated institutional investors.
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Arbitrage opportunities have increased with the number of cross-listed
assets and with the advent of different exchanges. In response, regulators require
that quotations be “harmonized” across different exchanges to ensure that market
participants are trading their equities at the best price. To be compliant with
Regulation National Market System (NMS)2, every exchange is required to feed
information about the orders it’s receiving to an entity called the Security
Information Processor (SIP), which then computes the publically displayed National
Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). This process creates an opportunity for latency
arbitrage, which uses faster execution speeds to complete trades faster than
competitors. These opportunities arise when private companies have the ability to
collect and compute the information going into the SIP faster than the SIP can,
thereby “predicting” what the NBBO will be.
Intuitively, the consequences of such arbitrage could be ambiguous, but Wah
and Wellman (2013) build a stylized model to analyze the impact latency arbitrage
has on market performance. Their stylized model looks at only two exchanges that
trade one security, one high-frequency trader (HFT) and multiple background (non
high-frequency) traders. They find that the inclusion of latency arbitrageurs results
in a reduction in total surplus, slightly improved execution times, and reduced
liquidity represented by wider bid-ask spreads.
The aggregate costs of pursuing zero latency are largely unknown, but the
Regulation NMS requires that exchanges execute trades at the best price for all
exchanges, harmonize prices across trading centers, make prices round to the
nearest penny except for stocks trading below $1.00, and update market data rules.
For a full explanation of Regulation NMS, see Securities and Exchange Commission
(2005)
2
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pursuit of zero latency has become big business for firms participating in financial
markets. There are a large number of firms that provide financial companies with
low latency services, including Spread Networks, Ciena, Lightower, and TNS. High
frequency trading firms do indeed pay for the ability to compete on the basis of
speed by co-locating their servers at different exchanges. Since light travels at a
finite speed, co-location reduces the amount of distance the information needs to
travel through fiber optic cables to reach the computers that automatically execute
trades. The reason why firms are willing to pay a fee is that trading on speed is a
winner take all competition. If a trader is second in line, they will not be able to take
advantage of the arbitrage opportunities available (Baron et al, 2016).
Although all of these firms’ websites tout the benefits of their services,
“Milliseconds can mean millions of dollars, (Ciena)” none of them provide any
information as to what their services cost. Fortunately, the cost of building the
infrastructure to provide some of these services is reasonably well documented. For
example, in an effort to reduce latency, Spread Networks installed an 825-mile fiber
optic cable between New York and Chicago3. This cable reduces latency by
approximately 3 milliseconds by utilizing a route that is approximately 100 miles
shorter than their competitors (Steiner, 2010). Spread has not released the cost of
installing the cable, but the estimated cost of the cable is approximately $300
million (Budish et al, 2013). It’s not entirely clear that this cable will serve no
purpose if a faster technology, such as microwave towers or drones, are employed,
but its usefulness outside of the financial markets seems close to nil.
3

http://spreadnetworks.com/network-map
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When considering trading on speed, increased market regulation does not
explain the increased incentives to rent seek. The returns to trading on speed have
been the result of technological innovation, innovation in financial assets, market
fragmentation promoted by competition, and the high costs associated with highspeed algorithmic trading; not stricter regulation. In response to the increased
sophistication of investors, firms that represent groups of unsophisticated investors
have had to increase their investment in technology to reduce the likelihood of
being taken advantage of by their faster counterparts.
A study done by Foucault et al (2016) provides just a small snapshot into a
type of rent seeking activity in financial markets that they refer to as “toxic
arbitrage”. By their definition, an arbitrage opportunity is considered toxic when the
price of an asset pair differs across sellers, and one seller sells the asset at the “stale
quote”. They argue that the number of stale quotes is increasing as a result of
increased market fragmentation, including the creation of new “lit” exchanges, dark
exchanges, electronic communications networks (ECNs) and off-exchange market
makers4, and the proliferation of derivatives. Increased fragmentation, coupled with
a decrease in latency, increases the likelihood that an arbitrageur can pick off a
seller with a stale quote.
Using data from currency markets, Foucault et al (2016) find that a 1%
increase in the likelihood that the arbitrageur wins is associated with a 4% increase
in bid ask spreads. This reduction in liquidity for increased price efficiency increases
the costs of other investors participating in currency markets, which they estimate
4

For a review of the market fragmentation literature see SEC (2013).
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to be $161,000 per day. They show that there is a significant amount of daily
variation in the number of arbitrage opportunities available, but provide no
evidence that a reduction in the duration of arbitrage opportunities leads to a
reduction in the number of arbitrage opportunities available. They also show that,
the average arbitrage opportunity in this market lasts 0.89 seconds in their sample.
Introducing technology that allows for computers to directly introduce trades5
reduced the average duration of arbitrage opportunities by 62 milliseconds.6
The term toxic arbitrage is a bit surprising as economists often view
arbitrage as something that increases market efficiency. When the same asset has
different prices on two different trading platforms it is called cross-market
arbitrage. This type of arbitrage occurs in markets where the prices of the same
asset do not adjust at the same speed. In response to the difference in prices, an
arbitrageur can step in and capitalize on the arbitrage opportunity or the market
maker can update their quote. If the arbitrageur is faster than the market maker, the
market maker suffers a loss at the expense of the arbitrageur. In this example, the
arbitrageur has performed an important economic function of increasing pricing
efficiency by reducing the amount of time that a stale price is listed in a market, but
he also may have a negative impact on liquidity as market makers will increase their
bid/ask spreads as a result of the increased risk.
Latency arbitrage is a winner takes all proposition. If a trader is an instant
slower than another (measured in fractions of a millisecond) they lose the arbitrage
In 2003 Reuters introduced the “AutoQuote API” which allows for the automated
entry of trades by algorithms.
6 Or about half the duration of a blink of an eye.
5
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opportunity to the faster trader. The consequences this type of rent seeking can be
demonstrated by a simple arms race game. Assume that there is an arbitrage
opportunity that exists with a value a available to two firms. The firm that can
execute the trade the fastest receives the entirety of the prize, a, while the slower
firm receives nothing. An outside firm provides a subscription service to access the
fastest trading technology at an average cost per trade, c, which firms can choose to
pay or not to pay. If they do not pay for access, they incur no technology costs and
use an inferior technology, which is the default technology for both firms. If both
firms use the same technology, they have an equal chance to win the prize, a. This
simple game can be represented as follows:

Buy

Don't

Buy

1
1
a − c, a − c
2
2

a − c, 0

Don't

0, a − c

1 1
a, a
2 2

It can be shown that (Buy, Buy) is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the
game if c is less than

1
a . This outcome is Pareto inferior to the outcome where both
2

players do not invest in the technology. In this stylized game, the total cost to the
players of playing the Nash Equilibrium strategy is 2c.
Pursuing trading speeds that are milliseconds faster than the competition is
rent seeking. As a result of the transaction, no new wealth is created. Instead, the
faster firm simply earns a rent from the slower trader and pays the technology
service provider a fee. If both firms purchase the superior technology, there is no
transfer of wealth between the two traders; the firm providing the technology
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captures at least some of the available rent. However, the total cost to society is not
known from this game and depends on the opportunity cost of the resources that
are needed to use the technology.
Beyond showing that there can be social costs to rent seeking, this example
also illustrates the complexities of identifying what agents engage in rent seeking. In
this case, both financial firms may be thought of as rent seekers as they are looking
to use technology to secure an edge over their opponent without creating any new
wealth. Even though it captures part, if not most, of the rent, the technology firm is
not rent seeking as it creates and provides the new technology to the traders. In
addition, the employees7 of the firm are facilitating labor, as they are simply hired to
perform a function for the rent seeking firm and its managers.
If it is the case that high-speed arbitrage increases the cost of executing
trades without reducing the number of arbitrage opportunities it is hard to conclude
that these types of high-speed arbitrage opportunities are anything but rent seeking.
They simply represent a transfer of wealth from investors and market makers to
arbitrageurs with the caveat that pricing efficiency is improved by fractions of a
second. It is hard to see the benefit of this type of activity to the economy as a whole.
Latency arbitrage opportunities can come about as a result of things other
than the market fragmentation example outlined above. High frequency trading
firms can also use latency to process news and order flow (Baron et al, 2016). This
type of competition through speed results in adverse selection as some market
participants have information about an asset that others do not (Biais, et al, 2015).
7

At least those without decision making power
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For instance, a financial firm may sell an asset to a less sophisticated market
participant that they know for certain is about to decrease in value. The
consequences of adverse selection in markets are well documented and the concept
of “foreknowledge” is dealt with in Hirshleifer (1971) and Fama and Laffer (1971).
In these papers, it is clearly shown that the production of information about future
states for the purposes of trading before that information becomes public leads to
incentives for private agents to speculate based on that information or to re-sell the
information. Firms and individuals with private information about the future use
that information to increase individual profits. However, the private returns from
this foreknowledge do not increase social welfare. Instead, if there are costs
associated with producing the private information, the result is a reduction in public
welfare compared to when that information is disseminated publicly.
The speed advantage of the speculator corresponds to foreknowledge
relative to the market maker. They know what happened to the true price of the
asset before the rest of the market as a result of their superior technology. The
speculator, keeping that information private, executes the arbitrage opportunity and
earns a profit by redistributing wealth from the market maker to himself or herself.
Imagine instead that both the market maker and the speculator receive the new
information at the same time and process it at the same speed. In this case, the
market maker updates its price and this price adjustment is precisely the same price
adjustment that would have happened in the absence of the arbitrageur.
Fortunately, there are laws in the United States that mandate markets distribute
information simultaneously to all participants. Unfortunately, private firms spend a
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large amount of money to ensure that they can process the information faster than
other participants, making it indistinguishable from the case where they get the
information first.
The existence of the possibility of obtaining and processing information
before the rest of the market encourages rent seeking. If the speculator continues to
use resources to try to produce private information, the outcome is not socially
optimal as those resources used to rent seek are wasted, even if they obtain no
rents. In sum, when information is private, the speculator captures private rewards
and market participants lose as market makers may increase their bid/ask spreads
to protect themselves from being taken advantage of by more sophisticated traders.
The potential costs of such strategies include the costs of physical capital, the
networks and computers used, and also the opportunity cost of human capital.
In the case of latency arbitrage, markets could indeed use speed to update
market quality and reduce the likelihood of rent seeking firms to proliferate. Instead
of selling access to speed to predatory firms, they could provide access to speed to
market makers to obtain a socially superior outcome through increased market
liquidity and price discovery. Ensuring that market makers are the fastest agents in
financial markets, would remove the incentives for arbitrageurs to invest in
technologies.
Alternatively, Budish et al. (2015) suggest that high frequency trading firms
have the opportunity to rent seek based solely on market design. They argue that
the use of continuous time trading leads to rent seeking opportunities and wasteful
investment in technology that rewards market participants for executing trades
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milliseconds faster than their competition. They propose that switching from
continuous time trading to discrete time trading would remove the incentives for
this type of rent seeking activities.

C. Patents: Rents as a Consequence of Regulation
Patents exist as a means of fostering innovation and economic growth
through the creation of intellectual property rights. The primary benefit of a patent
is that it entitles the owners to temporary monopoly rents based on their innovation
and therefore high private returns. Patents provide innovators with monopoly rents
with the hope that the long run benefits from innovation will outweigh the short run
social costs of monopoly. From a social welfare perspective, the benefits of market
power for the purpose of increasing economic innovation and growth date back to
the works of Schumpeter (1947), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Tandon (1984). 8
Secondary patent markets provide innovators the opportunity to sell or
license their patents to firms that wish to buy them. This allows the innovators to
realize immediate gains from their innovation and to facilitate the process from
invention to production. However, it will be argued that given the lack of perfect
enforceability of patents and a lack of transparency in secondary patent markets,
opportunities to rent seek are created through costly litigation, questionable patent
filings, and opportunistic patent arbitrage. In addition, the lack of enforceability of

It is not universally agreed upon that patents foster innovation and growth.
Boldrin and Levine (2013) provide an overview of why patents may not serve their
designated purpose.
8
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patents has created an industry where innovators sell questionable patents to firms
in hopes of reducing their litigation risk.
The ability to create, sell, and license patents in secondary patent markets
can provide a useful way to efficiently allocate ideas and resources. As was true with
the rent seeking opportunity of trading on speed outlined above, the secondary
market for patents is not a recent phenomenon. Dating back to the early 19th
century, many prominent inventors used secondary markets for patents and patent
licensing as a way to satisfy and finance their desire to invent, not to commercialize
products (Mossoff, 2015). In principle, a secondary market for intellectual property
rights plays an important role in an economy that uses market returns as a
mechanism for fostering innovation.
Unfortunately, wherever there are rents present, there are opportunities to
rent seek. In the case of intellectual property rights, the use of patent litigation, the
contesting of valid patents or protection of questionable patents in the courts, is
commonly used as a means of trying to capture some of the rents held by a patent
owner. Of course, some of this litigation is deemed to be socially advantageous, as
litigation can be used to protect ideas that were truly the unique contribution of an
inventor. In addition, litigation can improve social welfare by revoking invalid
patents that offer only trivial improvements or are not novel, as they would be
achieved through the normal process of production (Merges, 2009). However, in
some cases, the owners of these questionable patents file lawsuits against
manufacturers who allegedly violate their patents in order to extract rents.
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The creation of legally enforceable rents is only as good as their
enforceability. If property rights are viewed as suspect, there are large incentives to
litigate based on patent validity and infringement. This is especially true if the
innovation has significant commercial value. This transforms what was intended to
be guaranteed property rights into something akin to a lottery ticket, the value of
which is determined by not only the commercial value of the innovation but also the
probability that it can be defended in court (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). From the
other side of the argument, the risk involved with litigating an invalid patent may
incentivize the production of patents that have questionable validity. Because patent
litigation is costly, firms and individuals with fewer resources and higher levels of
uncertainty about the commercial value of their invention will be far more likely to
avoid litigation or settle outside of court.
This lottery approach to patents highlights the inefficiencies of new patent
production in the United States. The total cost of obtaining a patent is no longer the
fees paid to the United States Patent Office and legal fees paid to lawyers for
reviewing and filing the necessary paperwork. Instead, the total cost of obtaining a
patent includes the additional costs of defending the patents in federal court. Kesan
and Ball (2006) use the number of documents filed per case to show that pre-trial
costs associated with filing claims and settling cases before trial may not be “cheap”
and can often exceed half a million dollars. A survey by the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (2001) estimates the cost of patent litigation to be
between $500,000 and $3,000,000 per case. The high costs of litigation can
incentivize firms to settle the dispute outside of court. In the case where there are
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many firms that may benefit from the repeal of the patent, the threat of litigation can
be enough to lead firms to collude to preserve monopoly profits. In addition, they
suggest that case settlement may actually indicate inefficiencies in the patent system
that can lead to a collective action problem.
The uncertainty of property rights granted by patents, coupled with the high
costs of litigation, incentivize firms and individuals to create and file questionable
patents. This can lead to the creation of a “patent thicket” where firms must navigate
a large number of patents, including patents that are in the process of being
evaluated, to ensure that they are not infringing on someone else’s intellectual
property rights (Shapiro, 2001). The risks for firms can be significant, as they may
result in financial liability or an injunction to cease production.
There are a number of barriers that may prevent a patent from being
challenged. First, patents that have been awarded are assumed to be valid by the
courts. This places the burden on the challenger to provide “clear and convincing”
evidence that the patent should be revoked. Second, the costs of litigation are
significant. This can often lead to a large number of questionable patents that go
unchallenged. While litigation can sometimes be thought of as rent seeking, it may
actually be an undersupplied social good in the case of invalidating questionable
patents. (Hall et al. 2003)
To illustrate this, consider a firm that has been awarded a questionable
patent with significant commercial value. With the patent in hand, the firm has
exclusive rights to produce the product and can issue a cease and desist order to
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firms that do not license the patent from them.9 Further, there are two other firms
who would benefit from having the patent revoked. An individual firm may file a
lawsuit against the patent holder in hopes of having the patent overturned through
a trial with cost, T, or both firms can coordinate and split the cost of the trial. Both
potential challengers to the patent know that it is questionable and can either go to
trial in hopes of winning it with probability p or lose the trial with probability (1-p).
If the trial is successful and the patent is revoked, both firms split the benefit, w,
from winning the trial. If the trial is lost and the patent is upheld, both firms receive
the same benefit as if the patent were overturned, but they must pay the licensing
fee, l.10 At the beginning of the game, firms must decide whether or not to fight the
patent in court or pay a non-refundable licensing fee to the patent holder. If the firm
goes to trial and loses, it must pay the licensing fee in addition to the cost of the trial.
The following payoff matrix can represent this example:

License
Trial

License
.5w − l,

Trial
.5w − l,

.5w − l

.5w − l + pl − T

.5w − l + pl − T, .5w − l + pl −.5T
.5w − l
.5w − l + pl −.5T

The above game is an assurance game, or stag hunt, for a range of
probabilities of winning the trial. To see this, note that player 1 pays the licensing
fee to the owner of the patent when player 2 decides to pay the licensing fee if:

.5w − l + pl − T < .5w − l

It is assumed that licensing the patent is preferable to not producing at all.
For the purposes of this example assume that .5w-l>0 and it is profit maximizing
for the patent owner to issue the license.
9

10
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Which is true if:
p<

T
l

So if the probability of winning is sufficiently low, player 1 will always choose to pay
the licensing fee when player 2 decides to pay the licensing fee. If T>l, then both
firms decide to license, even if the probability of winning the trial is unity.
If player 2 decides to go to trial, player 1 will go to trial if:

.5w − l + pl −.5T > .5w − l
Which is true if:
p>

.5T
l

If both of the above inequalities hold, due to the symmetry of the game, there are
two pure strategy Nash Equlibria; (License, License) and (Trial, Trial). These Nash
Equilibria can be Pareto ranked, with the (License, License) equilibrium being
Pareto inferior to the (Trial, Trial) equilibrium.
Beyond the uncertainty of winning the trial, another reason for this type of
collective action problem is that patent settlements, including licensing agreements,
are often made privately through a bilateral agreement without making the
settlement public (Gans and Stern, 2010). This places the onus on each firm to
individually negotiate settlements or collectively negotiate settlements through
patent pools. The problem with this type of transaction is that it does not promote a
transparent or liquid secondary market. Instead, it leads to further uncertainty
about the true market value of intellectual property. In some cases, firms may make
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reverse payments to competing firms to keep them from entering the market
(Shapiro, 2001).
The uncertainty around a patent’s validity has led to a rise in “Non Practicing
Entities”, affectionately referred to as “patent trolls”. These firms are distinguished
from inventors and producers in that they acquire patents for the sole purpose of
selling or obtaining licensing fees for the patents, do not conduct R&D, and wait
until firms are most vulnerable before claiming infringement (Hagiu and Yoffie,
2013). This definition of patent trolls falls perfectly in line with this paper’s
definition of rent seeking in that they produce no output (including R&D) and their
private income is derived from the sale of a pre-existing asset that has value.
Opponents to this interpretation are likely to note that Non Practicing
Entities (NPEs) are not new and that they provide greater liquidity to secondary
patent markets by exploiting arbitrage opportunities. Both points may be true, but
they do not diminish their classification as rent seekers. From the seller’s side, the
existence of NPEs certainly increases the likelihood of selling a patent of uncertain
value, particularly among small firms and inventors. The lack of a well functioning
transparent marketplace makes finding willing buyers for patents difficult.
However, from the buyer’s side, it is not clear that privately licensing patents
increases market efficiency. Rather, NPEs are able to exert their power through
asymmetric information and opportunistic timing to extract rents from firms who
wish to use the protected technology for production. In addition, this has the added
social costs of allowing firms to continue to develop technologies, even when that
technology presumably already exists.
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The rise of patent trolls has led to the development of “defensive
aggregators” (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013). These firms act as group insurance against
NPEs in that they purchase large numbers of problematic patents and license the
rights to use them in the aggregators’ portfolio for a fee. In return, the former patent
holder receives protection against patent trolls by reducing litigation risk and
litigation costs for problematic patents. The defensive aggregators also assure
members that the patents held within the defensive aggregators’ portfolio would
never be used against them. This type of activity is defensive rent seeking, as it
provides protection for patents that would otherwise run a reasonable risk of being
invalidated.
The social cost of the issuance of weak patents exceeds the social cost of the
patent through the granting of monopoly rents. By fostering innovation and
presumably growth, these monopoly rents have been deemed to be socially
acceptable, based on the externalities generated from guaranteeing property rights.
However, the additional cost of rent seeking reduces the value of the patent system
and the likelihood that the benefits from innovation exceed the social costs of the
monopoly rents.

D. Rent Seeking Within Firms: Managers and Executives
Up to this point, this paper has demonstrated that rent seeking can happen as
a result of both technological innovation in competitive markets and government
regulation originally designed to foster innovation and growth. However, rent
seeking also takes place within the firm, as a result of hierarchical organizations.
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When decision-making power is concentrated among a small number of individuals,
workers, managers, and executives may spend time trying to influence these
decision makers, as opposed to producing output.
Milgrom (1988) refers to this type of rent seeking behavior as “influence
costs”. These costs are borne by firms with hierarchies that are highly centralized.
Under this firm structure, an employee can receive large benefits by spending time
trying to influence one, or just a few, of a firm’s primary decision makers. In
addition, decisions that make little difference to the firm, but have large impacts on
distribution within the firm, are likely to attract workers’ time.
In some instances, the costs of this type of activity are small. For example, a
firm may be trying to decide which employees to move to a newly acquired building
across the street. Some workers may have strong preferences towards staying in the
old building or moving to the new building. In this case, they may invest time trying
to influence managers based on their preferences. Although not directly related to
monetary compensation, this is a form of rent seeking.
Influence costs, however, can be far greater to firms than those simply
incurred when workers try to improve or maintain their working conditions. In the
face of uncertainty, firms may have to choose between different technologies,
allocating funds between departments, setting managerial pay, and determining
employee promotions. All of these decisions, when under the control of a small
group of decision makers, incentivize workers to split their time between producing
output and campaigning for managers and executives to act in a way that is in the
worker’s best interest.
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Scharfstein and Stein (2000) divide managerial rent seeking into two
different types of activities, “resume polishing” and “scorched earth”. The first
causes managers to spend time on making themselves more appealing to other
potential employers by participating in activities that only increase their external
visibility. The second involves managers adopting specialized practices that their
replacements would have a hard time understanding. These could include
specialized software, accounting practices, etc.
Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) suggest that managers may entrench themselves by
investing in uncertain investment projects that they will be able to observe the
outcome of before outsiders. These risky investments give the manager the ability to
use their private information to rent seek and negotiate better compensation
contracts than they would have received if they had made investments with more
certain returns. Alternatively, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that managers
have incentives to invest in projects that most closely align with their individual
skills, even when other projects may be value maximizing, in order to increase their
value to shareholders.
The effects of influence costs are sometimes realized through an inefficient
allocation of resources among divisions within a firm. Given that there is a scarce
amount of funds to be distributed, managers have incentives to lobby executives to
procure funds for their department. Knowing this, firms are left to weigh the
private, potentially distorted, recommendations of division managers against a
potentially noisy public signal (Wulf, 2009). In response, firms may implement
mechanisms to reduce the benefits of distorted signals from managers, which could
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be costly. In addition, differing power structures within hierarchical firms can result
in an inefficient allocation of funds in firms that are highly diversified (Rajan et al,
2000). This is especially true when the most influential managers head larger
divisions.
More recently, the importance of rent seeking through influence costs for
executives have come under some scrutiny. The primary source of these rents stem
from an agency problem between firms and shareholders. To try to alleviate this
agency problem, firms have increased the proportion of performance pay to
executives in hopes of more closely aligning the objectives of shareholders and
management. However, it is not clear that executive performance compensation
necessarily aligns the interests of the executive and firm, because the firm’s
objective is not perfectly contractible and a perfect performance measure does not
exist (Oosterbeek et al, 2011).
In the absence of a perfect performance measure, executives have incentives
to design compensation contracts that appear to align with shareholder’s objectives,
but also take advantage of the imperfect contractibility of performance. For
instance, executive pay has increasingly included stock options tied solely to the
market performance of the firm’s stock and not their performance relative to peer
firms (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Occasionally, this allows the executive to take
advantage of a strong stock market, even if their individual performance did not
have much effect on the stock price. Similarly, it allows for executives to take
advantage of above average industry performance, even if their firm underperforms
relative to its peers.
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With the existence of the imperfect contractibility of performance, executives
have incentives to rent seek to increase their guaranteed pay, in addition to their
performance pay. However, as the growth of executive pay outpaces the growth of
average worker pay, firms must justify or conceal the level of executive pay once it
reaches an “outrage constraint”. Firms can do this by hiring outside consultants to
examine whether or not the level of executive pay is appropriate (Wade et al, 1997)
or by hiding it in non-traditional pay such as below market rate loans and debt
forgiveness from the firm (Bebchuck and Fried, 2005).
In the study by Wade et al (1997), they examine how firms’ compensation
committees and executives justify executive pay practices. Broadly speaking, firms
can justify pay in three ways; through external compensation consultants, alignment
with shareholder interests, and firm performance. Using COMPUSTAT data from
255 companies that list their stock on the S&P 500 index, Wade et al (1997) find
that the type of pay justification used depends most strongly on the performance of
the firm, stock ownership concentration, and whether or not the CEO received a
bonus. Market-based justification is most likely to be used when the firm is doing
well, while external validation is used most often when the CEO receives a bonus
and/or a large proportion of shares is owned by an external shareholder.
Executive pay justification that responds to the state or organization of the
firm can be interpreted as rent seeking. In particular, the use of external
compensation consultants is costly for firms and tends to result in higher pay for
executives than their peer average (Gillan, 2001) and (Bizjak et al, 2008). In
addition, compensation consultants tend not to be fully external as they have other
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professional relationships with the firm (Bebchuck and Fried, 2005). This increase
in pay without a corresponding increase in performance, transfers income from
shareholders, who may have a large equity stake in a company, to executives, who
have incentives to rent seek as their performance is not perfectly contractible.
Intra-firm rent seeking shines light on the fact that wherever there are
agency problems, there is incentive to rent seek. The incentives to rent seek can be
reduced by a redesign of compensation contracts, managerial monitoring done by
the board of directors, the threat of hostile takeovers, and a fluid market for
managers. However, as was outlined above, managers and executives have
incentives to rent seek by undermining these discipline mechanisms. They do this
by maintaining personal and professional relationships with the board of directors,
camouflaging their compensation, and undertaking uncertain and manager specific
investments. In all of these cases, the end result is a transfer of income from
shareholders to managers in the form of rents.

E. Discussion: The Allocation of Human Capital
The urgency in which policy makers should deal with regulating instances of
rent seeking depends on the social costs of the rent seeking activity. For instance, if
the amount of physical capital used is large, such as in the case with latency
arbitrage, policy makers should act swiftly so that capital can be re-directed to more
productive activities. However, rent seeking activities may become particularly
damaging in terms of the misallocation of human capital. In particular, if rent
seeking or facilitating labor earns high salaries, then the opportunity cost of rent
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seeking may be extremely high as rent seeking activities may draw workers away
from socially productive endeavors.
The syphoning of highly educated workers away from socially productive
endeavors is apparent in the financial markets. Long gone are the days of a large
trading floors packed with thousands of traders. In 1980 there were 5,500 people
executing trades on the floor of the NYSE. In 2013, that number had dropped to 700.
Now, the raucous floor of the NYSE has become quiet enough to host permanent sets
for television networks like CNBC and Bloomberg. Because trades can be executed
directly through computer programs, highly educated computer programmers,
physicists and scientists have replaced boisterous, gruff, and often uneducated
traders. (Levine, 2013)
The change in the average skill level of finance workers is well documented
by Philippon and Reshef (2012). In their study, they track human capital intensity
and wage premiums in finance between 1909 and 2006. They find that high wages,
skill intensity and complexity are not permanent features and that finance has not
always been a high-skill intensive industry. Since 1970, the relative skill of workers
in finance with more than a high-school education compared to the US economy as a
whole has increased from approximately 0.5 to 0.1. This means that the share of
high-skill workers employed in finance has increased from 5% higher to 10% higher
than in the average sector (Philippon and Reshef, 2013). More striking, however, is
the dramatic increase of the most skilled workers employed at financial firms.
For example, in 1982 Jim Simons founded Renaissance Technologies LLC, an
investment management company that handles over $15 billion in assets. He was
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not a savvy “businessman” or experienced trader, but a former code breaker for the
Department of Defense and a former Mathematics professor at MIT and Harvard.
According to their website, the company hires much in the same vein with “roughly
half” of their 150 Long Island employees possessing a PhD in scientific disciplines.
And Renaissance Technologies is not alone, the Prediction Company, founded
by James Farmer and Norman Packard, who left their jobs at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and a tenured position as a professor of physics at the University of
Illinois respectively, requires their employees to have their masters or equivalent in
fields like mathematics, statistics, physics, financial engineering, etc. to be
considered for a job as a quantitative research analyst. Want to write code for the
Prediction Company? A degree in computer science is compulsory (Prediction
Company). Want to work as a quantitative researcher at Citadel? You better pack
your PhD, be ABD, or a junior faculty member in economics, engineering, finance,
mathematics, or physics (Citadel).
The opportunity cost of losing these workers to become facilitating labor or
rent seekers should not be understated. As Simon Jones, a former quantitative
trader at Citi puts it,
“I was working with the best of the best. My bank employed the
brightest engineers, chemists and scientists – and we were all working
together to get richer. The chemical and physics and health industries
are worse off because of what we do because I tell you this: if there was
a pay bonus structure similar to what we had in the City for curing
cancer, we’d have found a cure for cancer.” (Manzoor, 2013)
Although this quote has lofty expectations for facilitating labor, policy makers need
to take seriously the potential consequences of rent seeking when it comes to the
reallocation of human capital from socially productive activities to rent seeking
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activities.

F. Conclusions
What is true about all the aforementioned forms of rent seeking is that none
of them are new. In the financial markets, trading on speed was not done
automatically by computers, but by traders who purchased floor seats on the New
York Stock Exchange. From their very implementation, patents have been filed and
contested. Hierarchical firms have provided managers with incentives to rent seek
for all of modern history.
Just because rents have been around for a long time does not mean that the
problems of rent seeking have been solved or that they have become insignificant. In
fact, the importance of rent seeking is likely to ebb and flow throughout all stages of
economic development. On the one hand, weak institutional structures can lead to
high levels of rent seeking through the socially wasteful acts of theft and bribery. On
the other hand, highly developed and robust institutions can provide opportunities
to rent seek through poorly designed legislature, the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, technological innovation, and hierarchical firm organization.
Of particular concern is that, in general, the roles within the economy that
afford workers the opportunity to participate as facilitating or rent seeking labor are
classified at “high-skill”. This does not mean to suggest that positions without the
opportunity to rent seek are low-skill. In fact, many “low-skill” jobs require very
technical skills in order to be performed correctly. Instead, they are high-skill in the
sense that people in these roles possess some sort of post-secondary education. In
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the case of algorithmic traders, this may include both STEM and finance degree
recipients. In the case of patents it is likely to include individuals who possess
business and law degrees. For managers, it may include people who hold degrees in
business, the social sciences, and finance, among others.
The perverse incentives to rent seek raise concerns about the allocation of
talent within an economy that provides opportunities to rent seek primarily to those
with postsecondary degrees. This may be of significant importance to policy makers
as an increase in the number of highly educated workers, resulting from increased
opportunities to or incentives for rent seeking, may lead to worsening economic
outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
“A POST-KEYNESIAN MODEL OF RENT SEEKING”

A. Introduction
This chapter focuses on how changes in rent seeking, defined as any activity
that has private returns that come from a redistribution of wealth and not from
wealth creation (Murphy et al, 1996), impact the income distribution, low-skill
employment, and the level of output along the balanced growth path. As was
outlined in the previous chapter, examples of rent seeking activities include, but are
not limited to, trading in financial markets, patent litigation, and intra-firm rent
seeking.
Much of the discussion around income distribution and growth has been
focused on income and wealth inequality amongst individuals. The discussion almost
always excludes an examination of the allocation of workers between different types
of economic activities. This is not to say that analyzing the income distribution
between individuals is unimportant. In fact, it has motivated some of the rent
seeking taking place in today’s economy. The model presented here includes both an
analysis of changes in the income distribution along with an examination of worker
allocation. However, some of the negative economic consequences attributed to
increasing income and wealth inequality may still occur in the absence of increasing
income and wealth inequality. Therefore, even when rent seeking does not lead to
increased income and wealth inequality, it is still socially wasteful and has
meaningful impacts on the macroeconomy.
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Previous attempts at modeling rent seeking focus on the allocation of
workers and the effect it has on innovation and therefore accumulation. Murphy et
al (1991) assume that workers can choose between becoming “entrepreneurs”, in
the sense that they can improve the production process through technological
innovation, or rent seekers. Other models focus on the explicit role that government
plays in the creation rent seeking opportunities or assumes that rent seekers are
drawn from a homogenous pool of workers (Acemoglu, 1995).
This model differs from previous models of rent seeking on three fronts.
First, instead of focusing on growth effects of rent seeking, it analyzes the impacts of
rent seeking on the employment rate of low-skill workers along the balanced
growth path. Second, it brings the distribution of income and aggregate demand to
the center of the analysis through the inclusion of three different types of agents;
capitalists, high-skill workers, and low-skill workers who all have different saving
behavior. Finally, it makes the assumption that obtaining a postsecondary degree is
necessary to participate as an employee facilitating rent seeking. This leads to
changes in rent seeking having an impact on not only the distribution of high-skill,
credentialed, workers but also on the production of individuals with a
postsecondary degree.
One of the key assumptions of the model is that rent seeking takes place at
the firm level and that workers are hired as cost to firms that engage in rent seeking.
Therefore, high-skill workers are hired as facilitating labor and that they are not
playing the role of the rent seeker. What is important for this discussion is that an
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increase in rent seeking opportunities causes firms to increase their demand for
facilitating labor.
Fluctuations in the facilitating labor share of income can come about as a part
of the development process, a product of technological innovation, changes in
attitudes towards rent-seeking activities, or a function of the state of the political
system. However, this paper does not set out to answer the question of the
endogenous evolution of the share of income paid to facilitating labor. Instead, it has
a much more modest goal of analyzing the potential impacts of a shift from an
economy where rent seeking opportunities are scarce and the demand for
facilitating labor is low to economies where rent seeking opportunities are more
prevalent and the demand for facilitating labor is high.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section B provides some
motivation for the existence of rent seekers. Sections C-F outline the assumptions of
the model in regards to the production of output, the production of high-skill
workers, and mature economies. Sections G-H outline a Post-Keynesian growth
model with rent seeking and analyze the impact of rent seeking on low-skill
employment and the model’s stability conditions. Section I concludes.

B. The Determination of Rents
The primary innovation of this paper is the inclusion of rent seeking within a
Post-Keynesian framework. For the purposes of this paper, an activity is considered
to be rent seeking if its “private returns come from the redistribution of wealth from
others and not from wealth creation (Murphy et. al., 1991).” However, it should be
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noted that the firms responsible for hiring people to procure rents are not
necessarily the ones that receive the entirety of the rents. Instead, firms must pay
facilitating labor a share of their income for their services.
The definition of rent seeking used in this paper is likely too strong. In
practice, some activities contain both rent seeking and wealth creating elements.
However, the majority of rent seeking activities share the characteristic that their
returns are primarily a result of the transfer of income and wealth between parties
and not the creation of output and new wealth. In this sense, rent seeking activities
have a zero-sum component where the effort exerted by workers is unproductive as
no output is created, but functional in the sense that they defend or increase the
profit share of the firm. Put differently, rent seeking activities have a private return
while producing social waste.
With this in mind, workers can spend their time participating in rent seeking
activities as facilitating labor instead of activities that directly contribute to the
production of output. In the United States, rent seeking activities include things like
lobbying, trading in financial markets, tax compliance, and patent creation and
defense amongst others.
Given that rent seeking activities only serve to redistribute wealth and
income, the type of rent seeking being examined can be represented by a zero sum
game where two parties are fighting over a fixed income. In this context, firms can
be fighting over market share through certain types of advertising campaigns or
lawyers to defend intellectual property rights. Similarly, financial firms may hire
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workers to compete over fixed returns to arbitrage opportunities through latency
(Budish et al, 2015).
In the two-firm case, the structure of a generic rent seeking game is as
follows. Rent seeking firms can either hire facilitating labor to rent seek at a cost
measured as a percentage of total industry output, η y , or it can choose not to rent
seek and does not hire facilitating labor. If neither firm chooses to hire facilitating
labor, the two firms produce their equilibrium share of output, α . If one firm
chooses to hire facilitating labor and the other firm does not, the firm pays their
facilitating labor a percentage of the industry’s total output, η y , and receives
income in the form of rents, r, from the other firm. If the firm chooses not to hire
facilitating labor when the other firm chooses to hire rent seekers, the firm loses
income equal to the rents, r.

Hire

Hire
Don't
α (1 − η ) y, (1 − α ) (1 − η ) y α (1 − η ) y + r, (1 − α ) y − r

Don't α y − r, (1 − α ) (1 − η ) y + r

α y, (1 − α ) y

Hiring facilitating labor is the strictly dominant strategy for all values of r> αη y and
r> (1 − α )η y . If these inequalities hold, the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of
the game is reached when both firms hire facilitating labor. At the Nash Equilibrium,
the net change in the firms’ market share is zero but profit-maximizing firms still
choose to hire facilitating labor at a cost. This reduces the industry’s total surplus by
ηy.
There are three important findings from this game. The first is that profit
maximizing firms will not hire facilitating labor if there are not rent seeking
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opportunities available to them or if the return from rent seeking is less than the
cost of hiring facilitating labor. Second, no rents need to be earned by any firm for
facilitating labor to be hired. All that is required is that there are rents available to
be captured. Together these two findings suggest that increases in the size of the
available rents increases the share of output being paid to facilitating labor. Finally,
rent seeking can be entirely eliminated through a tax on either rents or the hiring of
facilitating labor. Unfortunately, in practice taxing rents is difficult as they are
sometimes hard to distinguish from productive activities and rent seeking activities
may also have a wealth-generating component.
The existence of rents can affect the economy through two different
channels. The first channel is through a change in the distribution of income. Rent
seeking represents a redistribution of income between capitalists through the
distribution of rents and from capitalists to facilitating labor through the costs
associated with rent seeking. If facilitating labor has a different marginal propensity
to save, the hiring of facilitating labor will change aggregate saving behavior. The
second channel, the hiring of facilitating labor, impacts the labor market. If
facilitating labor is scarce, changes in employment caused by an increase in the
amount of rent seeking could impact the level of output by reallocating workers
away from output related activities toward rent seeking activities and by increasing
the number of people obtaining a postsecondary education.
It is impossible to pin down the value of η, but it is assumed that the
percentage of total output paid to facilitating labor is a fixed proportion of the
amount of output produced. This means that total amount of income being paid to
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facilitating labor is ηY where η is the facilitating labor share of income. The
percentage of total output paid to facilitating labor can change over time, but for the
purposes of this paper these changes are assumed to be determined exogenously.

C. Assumptions
1. Overview of the Model
This model assumes a heterogeneous labor force. In the production process,
firms employ three factors of production to produce a single good, capital, high-skill
labor, and low skill labor. High-skill labor is differentiated from low-skill labor in
that high-skill workers have obtained a post-secondary degree. As a result of their
higher productivity, high-skill workers are paid a premium over low-skill workers.
The stock of high-skill workers is not fixed and low-skill workers can transform
themselves into high-skill workers through a postsecondary education system.
Capitalists receive a profit share and sell a single good at a markup over average
total costs. In addition to the traditional production process, firms can rent seek in
an attempt to increase the individual firm’s profit share. To do this, they hire highskill workers to facilitate the firm’s rent seeking. In return, facilitating labor is paid a
percentage of total output.
Capitalists are assumed to save out of profits, high-skill workers involved in
productive activities save out of wage income, facilitating labor saves out of their
share of income, and low-skilled workers do not save. It is assumed that capitalists
have a higher saving rate than high-skill workers employed in output activities and
facilitating labor. This means that an increase in the share of income being paid to
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high-skilled workers or facilitating labor reduces aggregate saving. Along the
balanced growth path, saving must be equal to investment and the economy grows
at the natural rate of growth defined as the growth rate of the labor force.

2. The Production Process
As a simplifying assumption in many Post-Keynesian models, it is assumed
that the production function has fixed coefficients and that the production of output
depends on two inputs, capital and labor. However, by relaxing the two input
assumption and including a heterogeneous labor force additional insights can be
gained. Therefore, the model in this paper assumes three types of agents; capitalists,
high-skill workers, and low-skill workers.
Following Dutt and Veneziani (2015), high-skill workers and low-skill
workers are qualitatively different in that they possess different roles in the
production process. They are distinguished from one another in that high-skill
workers have obtained a postsecondary degree while low-skill workers have not. By
obtaining a degree, Dutt and Veneziani argue that high-skill workers are
qualitatively different than low-skill workers in that they are inputs into the
production of a single good but that they can also induce technological progress and
“education as family members, educators and mentors.”
This paper follows their paper by asserting that high-skill workers and lowskill workers both contribute to the production of a single good and that high-skill
workers and low-skill workers are qualitatively different. However, instead of
assuming that high-skill workers contribute to technological progress as innovators,
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this paper assumes that they are distinguished from low-skill workers in that they
can be employed as facilitating labor. Finally, as a simplifying assumption it is
assumed that high-skill workers are fully employed. Therefore, the total labor force
of the economy is given by:

N = L + φ H + (1 − φ ) H + U

(1)

Where N is the size of the total labor force, L is the number of low-skill workers
employed, H is the number of high-skill workers, φ is the proportion of high-skill
workers employed in output related activities, (1 − φ ) is the proportion of high-skill
workers employed as facilitating labor, and U is the number of unemployed low-skill
workers. The employment rate of low-skill workers is therefore defined as:
e=

L
L +U

(2)

Where e is the low-skill employment rate.
A three input fixed coefficient production function includes low-skill labor, high-skill
labor, and capital. Algebraically,

Y = min [ L, φ H, K ]

(3)

Where L is the number of low-skill workers employed, φ is the proportion of highskill workers participating in output related activities1, H is the number of high-skill
workers employed, and K is the size of the capital stock. Given the production
function in equation 3, and assuming full utilization of L and H, the level of output
can be written as:
Alternatively, φ can be interpreted as the average proportion of time spent
onproductive activities as opposed to rent-seeking activities by high-skill workers
over the course of a workday.
1
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Y = uK = φ H = L

(4)

Where the rate of capacity utilization is given by u = Y / K .
Assuming that only high-skill workers are hired as facilitating labor it is
possible to write the total wage bill being paid to facilitating labor as:

ηY = wR (1 − φ ) H

(5)

Where wR is the average wage paid to facilitating labor.2
Payment to facilitating labor can be interpreted as a labor cost to firms.
However, rent-seeking labor costs are distinguished from production labor costs in
that they are fixed and no wealth or output is produced as a result. Therefore, gross
profits can be written as:

∏ = (1 − η )Y − W

(6)

Where ∏ is gross profits and W is the total wage bill due to employment used in the
production of output. For future use, the total wage bill can be divided into the wage
bill being paid to high-skill workers and the wage bill being paid to low-skill
workers such that:

W = WH + WL

(7)

WH
φ H wO
=
= τ >1
WL wL
L

(8)

Where:

WH is the total wage bill paid to high-skill workers employed in output related

2

wR =

ηY
(1− φ ) H
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activities, φ is the proportion of high-skill workers employed in output related
activities, WL is the total wage bill paid to low-skill workers, wO is the average wage
paid to high-skill workers employed in output related activities, wL is the average
wage paid to low-skill workers, and τ describes the average wage premium paid to
high-skill workers over low-skill workers employed in productive activities.
Dividing both sides of equation 7 by output and rearranging yields:

σπ + σW +η = 1

(9)

Where σ π is the profit share, σ W is the wage share, which can be divided into
income going to high-skill and low-skill workers, and η is the facilitating labor
share. Equation 10 differs from a two input income share equation in that the labor
share of income can be divided into three components. These components include
the share of income going to high-skill workers employed in output related
activities, the share of income going to low-skill workers, and the share of income
going to facilitating labor.

D. The Production of High-Skill Workers
High-skill workers may be employed as facilitating labor based on their
professional qualifications. In the case of legal proceedings, there is the requirement
that lawyers obtain law degrees before practicing law. However, when it comes to
other industries that rent seek, like finance, there is no written rule that facilitating
labor must possess a postsecondary degree. However, Philippon and Reshef (2012)
find that skill intensity and wages in finance increases with de-regulation. This
finding is consistent with the idea that increases in the opportunities to rent seek
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cause firms to increase their demand for facilitating labor. In turn, this causes an
increase in relative wages between facilitating labor and high-skill workers
employed in productive activities.
In the long-run, an increase in relative wages, wO / wR , should not be durable
as high skill workers will reallocate themselves between employment as facilitating
labor and employment in productive activities until the average wage earned by
both is equal.3 However, this process will likely take time and it is not clear that the
stock of high-skill workers participating in productive activities is well suited to
transition quickly to employment as facilitating labor. Instead, it is more likely that
the distribution of high-skill workers will be altered by the flow of new high-skill
workers into the labor force.
The flow of high-skill workers into the labor force depends on a broad set of
personal, social, intellectual, and financial considerations. Students face a very
complex problem and have imperfect information when deciding whether or not to
pursue a postsecondary degree. The influence of their intellectual interests, the
decisions made by their peers, and the advice of mentors surely plays an important
role. However, except for the most intellectually curious or very wealthy, the
decision to obtain a postsecondary degree depends on whether or not it will pay off
economically. In particular, given the significant upfront costs and foregone wages,
students need to decide whether or not the degree “pays off” and in many instances
whether or not they can come up with the money to attend at all.

This of course assumes that there are not any barriers to being hired as facilitating
labor beyond obtaining a postsecondary degree.
3
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In making the decision of whether or not to pursue a postsecondary degree,
and with the personal, social, intellectual, and financial considerations in mind, lowskill workers must compare the flow of the wage premium versus the cost of
obtaining the degree. Algebraically, a low-skill worker will obtain a degree if,

∫ (w

R

− E [ wL ]) e −rt dt ≥ C

(10)

Where C is the total cost of obtaining a postsecondary degree and E [ wL ] is
the expected low-skill wage after accounting for the low-skill employment rate. The
key feature of equation 10 is that the decision of whether or not to obtain a degree
depends on the return to a postsecondary degree. As the purpose of this paper is to
look at the long-run impacts of rent-seeking, it is assumed that in the long-run the
growth rate of high-skill workers is equal to the growth rate of the labor force. In
addition, since newly minted high-skill workers are free to engage in output related
or rent-seeking activities, the average wages paid to each of these activities must
equal one another along the balanced growth path. In addition, the ratio of the
average high-skill wage to the low-skill wage is pinned down to the constant
premium paid to high-skill workers. Consistent with equation 10, the human capital
accumulation equation can be written as:
Ĥ = γ 0 + γ 1

(τ −1) wL − δ = n
C

(11)

Where Ĥ is the growth rate of the stock of human capital, γ 0 is a shift parameter
representing social norms, γ 1 represents the sensitivity of students to future
earnings above the cost of attending a post-secondary institution, C is the total cost
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of obtaining a post-secondary degree, δ is the rate at which high-skill workers
leave the labor force, and n is the growth rate of the labor force.

E. Mature Economy
Most Post-Keynesian growth models omit the explicit treatment of the labor
market and the labor force in their analysis. This “dual economy” approach to
growth models excludes the examination of labor constraints and the treatment of
the rate of employment as an important consideration in firm’s investment
decisions. When analyzing the impacts of increased rent-seeking in developed
economies, excluding the impact of the employment rate on firms pricing and
output decisions is a serious omission.
This is not to say that rent seeking does not take place at every stage along
the development process. In developing countries that are politically unstable and
lack effective legal and judicial institutions the presence of rent seeking can reduce
growth through fear that investment opportunities will be upended by political
uprising or theft. In addition, rent seeking can take the form of payments to more
organized and powerful groups, especially the military (Kimenyi and Mbaku, 1993)
and by workers seeking high paying employment within the government (Gelb et al,
1991). When property rights are viewed as weak, incentives to rent seek are strong
particularly for rich agents (Sonin, 2003). In the dual economy framework,
analyzing the effect of rent seeking is an important task but one that is left for future
research.
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The approach taken in this paper is to examine the impact of rent seeking in
a developed economy like the modern United States economy, which lacks a large
amount of hidden unemployment. In this context, it seems unreasonable to maintain
the assumption that the employment rate has no influence on the growth rate as is
made in much of the Post-Keynesian literature.4
The primary consequence of moving toward a mature economy analysis is
that within a mature economy the equilibrium growth rate is pinned down to the
growth rate of the labor force, absent technological innovation. In the Harrodian
tradition this growth rate is referred to as the natural rate of growth. However,
within this tradition there is not a mechanism in place to assure that the warranted,
or actual, rate of growth will be equal to the natural rate of growth. Instead, the
Harrod-Domar model exhibits “knife-edge” stability where any change in a key
parameter will cause the economy’s growth rate, or warranted rate of growth, to
deviate permanently from the natural rate of growth.
This poses a problem for long-run growth analysis, as the existence of a
stable equilibrium long run rate of growth is doubtful and the economy grows at the
natural rate of growth only by chance. On the one hand, the economy may find itself
growing far faster than the growth rate of the population, plus technological
innovation, which is unsustainable as the economy will come up against labor
constraints. On the other hand, if the economy grows more slowly than the natural
rate of growth, the stock of unemployed workers is forever increasing and the

For an overview of mature economy Post Keynesian growth models see Skott and
Zipperer (2010).
4
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economy collapses to a dual economy where the labor market conditions have no
bearing on the growth rate.

F. Baseline Model
Following the Post-Keynesian tradition including Rowthorn (1981), Dutt
(1984), Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), and Robinson (1962) investment is a function
of the rate of capacity utilization and the profit share. Following Flaschel and Skott
(2006), Ryoo and Skott (2008), and Skott and Zipperer (2012) the mature economy
investment function is extended to include the employment rate as an additional
parameter. The extension of the investment function that is unique to this paper is
that investment also depends on the share of income paid to facilitating labor. The
baseline investment function is given by,
I
= f (u, σ π , e )
K

fu > 0 , fσ π > 0 , fe ≤ 0

(12)

Where u is the rate of capacity utilization (output to capital ratio), σ π is the profit
share and e is the employment rate of low-skill workers. Using equation 9, equation
12 can be rewritten as:
I
= f (u, η, σ W , e )
K

fu > 0 , fσ W < 0 , fη ≤ 0 , fe ≤ 0

(13)

Where σ W is the wage share of production workers and η is the facilitating labor
share of income. Increases in the rate of capacity utilization leads to an increase in
investment. Increases in the share of income going to facilitating labor, the labor
share of income, and the employment rate reduce investment.
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An increase in the share of income going to facilitating labor reduces
accumulation in this framework because facilitating labor is a cost to firms, so an
increase in the share of income going to facilitating labor reduces the aggregate
profit share. Therefore, firms require a higher rate of capacity utilization or a higher
profit share in order to entice the same level of accumulation. Similarly, high
employment rates reduce accumulation as high levels of employment increase the
bargaining power of low-skill workers and reduce animal spirits.
In this model there are two classes, capitalists and high-skill workers, both of
whom save. Low-skill workers consume the entirety of their income, capitalists save
out of profits, and high-skill workers save out of wage and rent income. Therefore,
the saving rate can be given by:
S
= s (u, η, σ W , τ )
K

su > 0 , sη < 0 , sσ W < 0 , sτ > 0

(14)

The important assumption made in the saving function is that capitalists have a
higher saving rate than high-skill workers and high-skill workers have a higher
saving rate than low-skill workers. Therefore, increases in the facilitating labor
share and the labor share have a negative effect on the saving rate. Finally, an
increase in the markup paid to low-skill workers has a positive effect on the saving
rate because it represents a transfer of income from low-skill workers to high-skill
workers given a constant labor share.5
To close the model, the equilibrium condition that the saving rate is equal to
It would be possible to include C as a determinant of the saving rate. However, lowskill workers do not save so presumably they are paying for their education by
shifting consumption from non-educational goods and services toward education
while they are obtaining their degree.
5
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the rate of investment and the maturity condition that accumulation is equal to the
growth rate of the labor force is imposed.
S
I
= s (u, η, σ W , τ ) = g =
K
K

(15)

g=n

(16)

Where S and I are net saving and investment, g is the accumulation rate, and
n is the growth rate of the labor force. The maturity condition is required for steady
growth. A growth rate above the growth rate of the labor force is ruled out as the
economy would eventually come up against a constraint in terms of the rate of
capacity utilization and/or the employment rate. A growth rate that falls below the
growth rate of the labor force would lead to a rate of employment that would
decrease secularly and the economy would turn in to a non-labor constrained, dual
economy.
In the remaining sections of this paper the effects of changes in the share of
income going to facilitating labor is examined in two different specifications. The
first specification allows for the rate of capacity utilization to vary freely with a fixed
profit share. The second specification requires that the desired rate of capacity
utilization be equal to the actual rate of capacity utilization in the long run. The
former specification is consistent with most versions of the Kaleckian model while
the later is most consistent with the Harrodian and Robinsonian traditions.

G. Fixed Markup
The first version of the Post-Keynesian model of rent seeking to be explored
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includes the explicit assumption that the rate of capacity utilization is free to vary in
the long-run and that the profit share is fixed. Since the profit share is determined
by a pricing markup equation in the production process, this also pins down the
wage share of income. However, changes in the profit share are allowed through
exogenous changes in the facilitating labor’s share of profits.

σW = σW

(17)

σ π = 1− η − σ W

(18)

Using equations 15, 16 and 17 the saving rate can be re-written as:
S
= s (u, η, σ W , τ ) = n
K

(19)

Since n, η , σ W , and τ are all exogenous variables, equation 19 determines a unique
equilibrium value of the utilization rate:
u* = u (η, σ W , τ )

uη > 0 , uσ W > 0 , uτ < 0

(20)

The equilibrium rate of capacity utilization is decreasing in the profit share as
increases in the profit share result in a reduction of aggregate demand as capitalists
are assumed to save a higher percentage of their income than high-skill or low-skill
workers. This means that increases in the wage share and increases in the share of
income paid to facilitating labor both increase the equilibrium rate of capacity
utilization. An increase in the markup paid to high-skill workers reduces the
equilibrium rate of capacity utilization as high-skill workers are assumed to save a
portion of their income and low-skill workers do not save. This leads to a reduction
in aggregate demand and capacity utilization.
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Using the equilibrium rate of capacity utilization and equations 13 and 16 it
is possible to write the rate of investment as:
I
= f (u (1 − η − σ W , τ ),1 − η − σ W , e ) = n
K

(21)

Again, since n, η , σ W , and τ are all exogenous variables, equation 21 determines a
unique equilibrium low-skill employment rate:

e* = e (u (1 − η − σ W , τ ),1 − η − σ W )

(22)

The equilibrium low-skill employment rate is increasing in the rate of capacity
utilization and the profit share. Therefore, increases in η and σ W will cause an
increase in the equilibrium employment rate through a capacity utilization effect
but a decrease in the rate of employment through a profit share effect. The overall
effect on the employment rate due to an increase in the facilitating labor share of
income is:

∂e
= euuη + eσ π ( −1)
∂η
Since eu > 0 , uη > 0 , and eσ π > 0 the effect of an increase in the facilitating labor
share of income on the rate of employment is negative if:

eσ π > euuη
The sign of which depends on the relative sensitivity of the investment function to
changes in the rate of capacity utilization and the profit share. However, something
can be said about the likelihood of this inequality holding. Consider the case where
high-skill workers and capitalists have a similar saving rate. This implies that the
effect of a change in the share of income paid to facilitating labor would have a
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relatively small aggregate demand effect and the change in the rate of capacity
utilization would also be small. This would lead to a small derived effect on the rate
of employment. Therefore, the more similar the saving rates are between capitalists
and high-skill workers, the more likely an increase in the facilitating labor share of
income is to lead to a reduction in employment.
In addition to the employment effect there is also a high-skill worker
allocation effect due to the change in the level of rent seeking. To see this, note that
the total wage bill can be written as:

wOφ H + wL L = σ W Y

(23)

Using equations 4, 8, and 23 the wage paid to high-skill workers participating in
output activities can be written as:
wO =

τ
σW
1+τ

(24)

Using equations 5, 17, and 24 it can be shown that the equilibrium proportion of
high-skill workers employed in output related activities is:

τ
σW
φ* = 1 + τ
τ
η+
σ
1+τ W

(25)

Since the high-skill to low-skill wage ratio and the wage share paid to workers in
output related activities are constant in the Kaleckian framework, an increase in the
share of income going to facilitating labor must lead to a reduction in the proportion
of high-skill workers participating in output related activities in order to keep the
average wage paid to high-skill workers in output related activities equal to the
average wage paid to facilitating labor.
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Additionally, an increase in the share of income going to facilitating labor
increases the high-skill to low-skill labor ratio. However, unlike in neoclassical
growth models there is not necessarily an increase in growth due to the increase in
human capital. Instead, because the increase in high-skill workers is caused by an
increase in rent seeking the effect on long-run employment is ambiguous.

H. Flexible Markup and Fixed Rate of Capacity Utilization
It is not clear that in the long-run firms will be willing to allow the rate of
capacity utilization to permanently deviate away from their desired rate of capacity
utilization. Instead, equilibrium in the goods market can be achieved by allowing
prices and the rate of employment to adjust. In this setup, changes in aggregate
demand caused by a change in the distribution of income can cause both changes in
output, through changes in the rate of employment, and derived changes in the
distribution of income. In the face of a positive demand shock, the price of goods and
services are bid up causing the profit share of firms to increase.
With the assumption that changes in prices and employment, not changes in
the rate of capacity utilization, accommodate changes in the goods market, it is
assumed the rate of capacity utilization is equal to the desired rate of capacity
utilization. For simplicity, the rate of capacity utilization will be normalized to one.

u = ud = 1

(26)

Therefore, the rate of investment can now be written as:
I
= f (σ W , e, η )
K

fη < 0 , fσ W < 0 , fe < 0
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(27)

Equation 27 is decreasing in the share of income going to facilitating labor, the labor
share, and the rate of low-skill employment.
Increases in the employment rate can reduce the accumulation rate by
increasing worker turnover, by worsening the business climate, and by increasing
monitoring costs (efficiency wage). At high levels of employment it becomes more
difficult for firms to replace employees from the existing pool of unemployed
workers. This may cause firms to go out and recruit workers from other firms,
increasing the costs associated with their training and retaining of employees.
Additionally, as the employment rate increases, effort exerted by workers may
decrease requiring an increase in monitoring costs to maintain the desired level of
effort.
As in the baseline model, the saving rate is given by equation 14 and is equal
to the growth rate of the labor force along the balanced growth path:
S
= s (η, σ W , τ ) = n
K

(28)

Using equations 9 and 28 and setting u=1, the wage share can be written as a
function of the markup paid to high-skill workers and rent share of income:

σ W = ψ (η, τ )

ψη < 0 , ψτ > 0

(29)

To maintain a growth rate equal to the growth rate of the labor force, the saving rate
must be constant. Therefore, changes in any of the parameters that affect the saving
rate must be offset by changes in another parameter. In equation 28, changes in the
share of income going to facilitating labor results in a decrease in the saving rate as
it represents a transfer of income from capitalists to facilitating labor who are
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assumed to save less of their income. In order to maintain the same saving rate, the
profit share must increase resulting in a decrease in the wage share.
The fall in the wage share is a derived consequence of the increase in
aggregate demand caused by the transfer of income from capitalists to facilitating
labor. In this framework increases in aggregate demand are met by increases in the
profit share, which must be accompanied by a decrease in the wage share. Similarly,
an increase in the premium paid to high-skill workers results in a reduction of
aggregate demand as income is transferred from low-skill workers, who do not save,
to high-skill workers who do save. Since the rate of capacity utilization is fixed, the
wage share increases to equilibrate the goods market.
Using equation 29 it is possible to re-write equation 13 as:
I
= f (η,ψ (η, τ ), e ) = n
K

(30)

Which can be written as:
e = e (1 − η − ψ (η, τ )) eη < 0 , eτ > 0

(31)

To see that the employment rate is unambiguously decreasing in the share of
income going to facilitating labor, notice that the derivative of the equilibrium level
of employment with respect to η is given by:

∂e
= −1 − ψ η
∂η
Which is negative if ψ η > −1 . This occurs because an increase in the facilitating labor
share of income must imply a reduction in the profit share to maintain a constant
saving rate.
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In this version of the model there will also be a change in the equilibrium
proportion of high-skill workers participating in output related activities. However,
in this case, the wage share is no longer constant. Using equations 25 and 36 the
equilibrium proportion of high-skill workers participating in output related
activities is given by:

τ
ψ (η, τ )
φ* = 1 + τ
τ
η+
ψ (η, τ )
1+τ

(32)

The effect of an increase in the share of income going to facilitating labor is negative
if:

ψ η < ψ (η, τ )
Which it is because ψ η < 0.
This model suggests that increases in the level of rent seeking affect the
economy by reducing the long-run profit share and the wage share paid to workers
employed in production activities. Along the balanced growth path, a decrease in the
profit share causes a reduction in the equilibrium rate of low-skill employment. In
addition, increases in the facilitating labor share of income lead to a reduction in the
proportion of high-skill workers in the productive sector. This directly causes a
reduction in average productivity, as more high-skill workers are required to
produce the same amount of output.

I. Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that changes in the level of rent seeking can
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have negative effects on the low-skill employment rate, effects on the allocation of
high-skill workers, and impact the average level of human capital in the economy.
The negative employment effects are possible when the rate of capacity utilization
or the profit share is flexible. However, it is possible in the flexible capacity
utilization model that increased rent seeking may increase low-skill employment.
In both versions of the model, increased rent seeking results in an increase in
the proportion of high-skill workers employed as facilitating labor. By definition,
this results in a reduction in average productivity, as a higher number of high-skill
workers employed in the economy are needed to produce the same level of output.
Since workers are transformed into high-skill workers by obtaining a postsecondary
degree, which is costly, increased rent seeking is wasteful as money used to train
facilitating labor could be allocated to more productive activities.
In the context of neoclassical growth models, increased rent seeking results
in an increase in the average level of human capital as measured by the ratio of highskill workers to low skill workers. However, when increases in human capital are
the result of increases in rent seeking there is no guarantee that higher levels of
human capital result in higher growth. In fact, the model examined above is
consistent with the possibility that higher levels of human capital accumulation may
accompany a reduction in average productivity.
Second, no rents need to be earned by any firm for rent seekers to be hired.
Rather, rent seeking must be motivated by private returns to rent seeking activities.
The cost to rent seeking is the social waste of hiring facilitating labor to pursue
these private returns that have little social benefit. Since rents do not need to be
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earned by any firm for facilitating labor to be hired, the only way to eliminate rent
seeking is to eliminate the availability of rents.
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CHAPTER 3
“RENT SEEKING AND THE ALLOCATION OF COLLEGE GRADUATES: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES”

A. Introduction
Rent seeking is the pursuit of income that does not directly contribute to the
production of output. An activity is considered rent seeking when the private return
earned from that activity is the result of a transfer of income between two parties
and no output is produced (Murphy et al., 1991). As the opportunities to earn these
types of private gains increase, individuals may be drawn away from activities with
high social benefits, causing the average productivity in the economy to decrease. In
addition, rent seeking may cause a redistribution of income, which has an impact on
saving and investment behavior. This redistribution can have negative long-run,
low-skill, employment effects.
There are many examples of economic activities that redistribute income
without directly contributing to the level of output. A fairly straightforward example
of such an activity would be trading in the financial markets. Although certain
traders may contribute to improved efficiency in the marketplace, others simply
redistribute income from one group of traders to another. Recent technological
advances in the form of high frequency trading, black box trading, and other forms
of algorithmic trading have led to further increases in the ability of sophisticated
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traders to earn larger shares of total trading income, while only marginally
increasing market efficiency, if at all (Jarrow and Protter, 2011) (Zhang, 2010).
The financial markets are not the only place where rent seeking occurs. The
rising complexity of the tax code increases the cost of firms’ compliance with
corporate income tax law as they rely on a larger number of accountants to ensure
that they are taking full advantage of the ever-changing list of deductions
(Schoonjans et al., 2011) (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1996). Firms also hire a large
number of lawyers to defend their intellectual property, to protect themselves from
lawsuits, and to confirm that their activities do not violate pre-existing laws
(Merges, 2010). Within companies, managers and executives compete for income in
the form of bonuses and promotions. Contrary to the shareholder value movement,
heavily performance driven compensation contracts influence companies’
“rainmakers” to increase the short-run profitability of firms, sometimes at the
expense of long-run profitability and stability (Crotty, 2009). These profits are an
intertemporal transfer of income from individuals with future stakes in the
company to current executives. Some marketing activities may also be considered
rent seeking as firms redirect money to protect their market share instead of using
that money to create output (Cowling and Mueller, 1978).
Even though rent seeking may be prevalent in an economy, the level of rent
seeking occurring is hard, if not impossible, to measure empirically. One approach,
originally proposed by Murphy et al. (1991), is to use the number of postsecondary
students enrolled in law programs as a percentage of total enrollment as an
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indicator of the level of rent seeking. However, law students are an indicator of only
one type of rent seeking that may be taking place in an economy. In addition to
lawyers, accountants, executives, and financial traders also partake in rent seeking
activities and would go unobserved if only lawyers were used as an indicator of rent
seeking. This paper expands upon this indicator of rent seeking by including
business degree recipients, communications degree recipients, consumer science
degree recipients, and social science degree recipients1 as a broader indicator of
rent seeking.
One could argue that the composition of college graduates by field of study is
not as strong of an indicator of the degree of rent seeking as the composition of
employment across industries or occupations. However, industry composition or
even occupation composition may be a misleading indicator of the level of rent
seeking taking place. Industry and occupation data tend to be slow moving and path
dependent variables, and therefore are not a good measure of current opportunities.
Graduation data better reflects current employment opportunities.
In this paper, the use of college graduates by field of study as a measure of
the degree of rent seeking is not meant to suggest that the graduates themselves will
go on to become rent seekers. Instead, many of them obtain a degree in pursuit of a
job that facilitates rent seeking. Therefore, much of what is being captured by the

1

Social Science degree recipients are included in rent-seeking because they are
disproportionately likely to obtain management and finance jobs upon graduation. See
Appendix A.
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use of college graduates is the availability of jobs that facilitate rent seeking. As such,
the interpretation of the role of high-skill, or credentialed, workers in this paper is
facilitating labor that is hired by firms pursuing rents.
Related papers by Johnson et al. (2011) and Glaser and Saks (2006) analyze
the effect of the number of corruption convictions by the U.S. Department of Justice
between 1975 and 2000 has on state level growth. Johnson et al. (2011) find that
corruption has a negative effect on growth in the United States, while Glaser and
Saks find that corruption does not have a statistically significant effect on the
growth rate once controls are added. The use of corruption convictions in a state is
an innovative, but very specific measure, as it only captures illegal rent seeking
activities. Although a high number of convictions may lead to lower growth, this
measure omits a large category of legal forms of rent seeking that take place across
a wide variety of industries.
Using the composition of degree completions as an indicator of rent seeking,
this chapter provides both theoretical and empirical evidence that is consistent with
the claim that increased rent seeking has negative impacts on the economy. Using
state level graduation data constructed from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education System (IPEDS), it is shown through a series of cross-sectional and panel
regressions that increased rent seeking, indicated by the distribution of degrees
awarded by field of study, affects state level growth in real personal income per
capita.
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It should be stressed that, in this case, the distribution of college students is
not being interpreted as an input to the production function.2 Instead, a high
proportion of postsecondary students in rent related fields of study is an indicator
that the structure of the existing economy favors rent seeking, and that firms hire a
large proportion of the highly educated as facilitating labor3. In addition, the
distribution of degree recipients is not necessarily a measure of wage differentials
across prospective employment opportunities upon graduation, but rather a
measure of the overall composition and availability of jobs for credentialed workers.
Beyond its methodological similarity to the paper by Murphy et al. (1991),
this paper is related to a vast literature of country level and state level growth
regressions. In the 1990s, there was a proliferation of cross-sectional growth
regressions with studies by Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro et
al (1991), Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992), amongst many others. More
recently, cross-country panel growth regressions have become very popular,
including studies by Durlauf and Quah (1999), Bassinini and Scarpetta (2001), and
Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004). However, state level growth regressions are
far less popular, in part due to a lack of annual data. That being said, there are a
number of cross state growth analyses, such as those done by Frank (2009a and

2

In the empirical exercises that follow, the number of all college graduates as a
percentage of the population aged 18-24 is used as a measure of the flow of human
capital into the production function.
3 It should be noted that an alternative interpretation, where student composition
leads to growth in output, cannot be ruled out.
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2009b) and Johnson et al. (2011). Nevertheless, none of these papers include a
measure of rent seeking.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section B provides some
motivation. Section C develops a stylized model of rent seeking. Section D outlines
the data set and empirical approach. Section E presents the results and Section F
concludes the analysis.

B. Motivation
“Many of the best students are not going to research cancer, teach and
inspire the next generation, or embark on careers in public service.
Instead, large numbers are becoming traders, brokers and bankers. At
Harvard in 2014, nearly one in five students who took a job went to
finance. For economics majors, the number was closer to one in two. I
can’t help wondering: Is this the best use of talent?” (Mullainathan,
2015)
Standard human capital theory suggests that some of the variation in growth
rates across countries can be explained by differences in levels of human capital.
The simplest and perhaps most commonly cited model in support of this theory is
the augmented Solow-Swan model developed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
In this model, human capital is treated as an input into a stylized, Cobb-Douglas,
production function represented by:
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Y = K α H β ( AL )

1−α − β

Where Y is the level of output, K is the size of the capital stock, H is the level of
human capital, A is a measure of labor augmenting technology, and L is the size of
the labor force. The growth rate of output can be obtained by taking logs of both
sides of the production function and differentiating with respect to time to obtain:

(

Yˆ = α K̂ + β Ĥ + (1− α − β ) Â + L̂

)

One of the main findings of this model is that increases in the growth rate of
the human capital stock lead to endogenous increases in the growth rate of output,
ceterus paribus. This finding has led researchers to estimate the effect differences in
human capital have on differences in cross-country growth rates. Caselli (2005)
goes through a careful empirical analysis to examine the effect different measures of
human capital have on growth rates. In the human capital literature, the number of
years of schooling, the teacher-pupil ratio, the amount of teaching materials per
student, the number of structures per student, and the human capital of teachers are
shown to partially explain differences in growth rates across countries as they are
assumed to affect average productivity. The obvious policy recommendation that
comes out of this type model is that countries should implement policies to increase
the level of human capital.
In the United States these types of policy recommendations are prevalent.
Politicians from the right and the left have consistently argued that the way to
increase growth in America is to increase the level of human capital by increasing
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investment in primary, secondary, and post-secondary education. However, these
types of human capital policies ignore underlying institutional factors that influence
a country’s growth rate. In particular, economies that have a high proportion of
highly educated individuals participating in activities that do not directly produce
output could have a rapidly increasing stock of human capital to fulfill the increased
demand for credentialed workers and slow output growth.
This is not to say that increases in human capital cannot positively impact an
economy. High-skill labor forces surely produce more output than those that are
relatively low-skill assuming that they are employed in activities directly tied to the
production of output. Instead, this paper argues that economies that dedicate their
highly educated workers to facilitate rent seeking activities will tend to grow more
slowly than those that have highly educated workers that produce output. Put
differently, the effectiveness of human capital policies depends on what career
options are available to an economy’s highly skilled workers.

C. Model
The primary purpose of the model is to examine possible mechanisms by
which increased rent seeking negatively affects low-skill employment, redistributes
high skill workers from the production of output to the facilitating of rent seeking,
reduces average wages, and reduces average productivity as more workers are
required to produce the same amount of output. In the model, output is divided
between capitalists, high-skill workers and low-skill workers in the form of profits
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and wages, respectively. Following Dutt and Veniziani (2015), high-skill and lowskill workers are qualitatively different inputs in the production function and have
qualitatively different roles in the economy. High-skill workers and low-skill
workers both contribute to the production of output, but high-skill workers may
choose to be facilitating labor, which do not produce output.
It is assumed that the production function is a Leontief production function,
given by:

Y = min ( L, φ H, K )

(1)

Where Y is the level of output, φ is the proportion of high-skilled workers employed
in the output related activities, H is the number of high-skill workers in the
economy, and L is the number of low-skill workers employed. There is no
substitutability between high-skill and low-skill workers. Assuming that there is no
labor hoarding, output is given by:

Y = uK = φ H = L

(2)

Where u is the rate of capacity utilization Y/K and is assumed to be constant. Along
the balanced growth path, equilibrium requires that the growth rates of the highskill labor force, the low-skill labor force, and the population be equal:

Ĥ = L̂ = n

(3)

Where n is the growth rate of the population. For simplicity, it is assumed
that high-skill workers in the productive sector are paid a constant premium over
low-skill workers and is denoted by:
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wO
=τ
wL

(4)

Where wO and wL are the average wages paid to high-skill workers employed in
output related activities and low-skill worker respectively. High-skill workers are
paid a percentage of total output by firms for their services as facilitating labor.
Since high-skill workers are assumed to be the only ones that can be employed as
facilitating labor, the total amount of income paid to facilitating labor is equal to the
total wage bill going to high-skill workers employed by rent seeking firms:

ηY = wR (1 − φ ) H

(5)

Where η is the facilitating labor share of output and wR is the average wage paid to
high-skill workers employed as facilitating labor. Changes in the facilitating labor’s
share of income can be brought about through regulatory changes, such as changes
in the tax code, changes in the enforcement of intellectual property rights laws, and
changes financial regulation. However, changes in the facilitating labor’s share of
income may also happen organically within an economy through technological
change, financial innovation, changes in the structure of compensation contracts,
and changes in social norms.
In this model, rents can be interpreted as a tax on total output. Firms are
assumed to be profit maximizing and profits are given by the amount of output left
over after paying the wage bill and forfeiting a portion of total output to facilitating
labor. Gross profits are given by:
68

Π = (1− η )Y − W

(6)

Where the first term represents total post-rent revenue and the second term is the
total wage bill paid to workers employed in output related activities. Dividing both
sides of equation 6 by the level of output yields the profit share:

σπ = 1−η −σw

(7)

Where σ w is the wage share W/Y.
Capitalists save out of profits, high-skilled workers save out of both wage and
facilitating labor income, and low-skill workers consume the entirety of their
income. It is assumed that capitalists have a higher marginal propensity to save than
high-skill workers. This suggests that the saving rate is a function of the facilitating
labor share and the wage share.4

S
= s (η, σ π ) sη < 0 , sσ π > 0
K

(8)

An increase in the profit share has a positive effect on the saving rate, as it
represents a redistribution of income from workers to capitalists who have a higher
saving rate. Holding the profit share constant, an increase in the facilitating labor
share reduces the post-rent profit share. This is because an increase in the level of
rent seeking results in a transfer of income from capitalists to high-skill workers,
reducing the saving rate.

Increases in the premium paid to high-skill workers will have a positive impact on
the saving rate. However, in this version of the model the wage premium is assumed
to be constant.
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Since this is a long-run model, it is assumed that the utilization rate is equal
to firms’ desired rate of capacity utilization and can be normalized to 1. Following
Skott (1989), the post-rent profit share and the employment rate determine the rate
of growth of output:
Yˆ = h (σ π ,e )

hσ π > 0 , he < 0

(9)

An increase in the profit share makes increasing output more appealing to
firms, so the effect of a change in the profit share on the h function is positive.
Increases in the level of employment reduce the overall business climate as high
levels of employment increase workers’ bargaining power. Put differently, at high
levels of employment, firms require a higher profit share in order to increase the
rate of output growth. Using equations 7 and 9:
Yˆ = h (1− η − σ w ,e )

(10)

Along the balanced growth path, the growth rate of output and the saving rate (the
growth rate of the capital stock) must be equal to the growth rate of the labor force:

n = s (η, σ w ) = h (1 − η − σ w , e)

(11)

Using equation 11, it is possible to write the wage share as a function of the
facilitating labor’s share:

σ w = ψ (η )

ψη < 0 ,

(12)

Increases in the facilitating labor share unambiguously reduce the wage share, as a
lower wage share is required to keep the saving rate constant. Using equations 10
and 11, it is possible to write the output expansion function as:
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h (1− η − ψ (η ) ,e ) = n

(13)

This requires that:
e = e (1− η − ψ (η )) = e (η )

(14)

An increase in η has an unambiguously negative effect on the employment rate if:

ψ η > −1

(15)

This occurs because an increase in the facilitating labor share of income must imply
a reduction in the profit share to maintain a constant saving rate.
In addition to having employment effects, an increase in facilitating labor’s
share of income also has an impact on average productivity. To see this, use
equations 4, 5, and 12 to rewrite the high-skill wage as:

wO =

τ
ψ (η )
1+τ

(16)

An increase in the level of rent seeking therefore has a negative effect on the highskill wage. Using equations 2, 5, and 16 it is possible to write the equilibrium
proportion of high-skilled workers employed in the productive sector as:

τ
ψ (η )
φ* = 1+ τ
τ
η+
ψ (η )
1+τ

(17)

An increase in η reduces φ * if:

ηψ η < ψ (η )
Which it is, since:
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ψη < 0
Therefore, a reduction in the proportion of high-skill workers employed in output
related activities unambiguously reduces the average level of productivity, as a
larger stock of high-skill workers is required to produce the same amount of output.
This model suggests that increases in the facilitating labor share affect the
economy by reducing the long-run profit share and the wage share paid to workers
employed in output related activities. Along the balanced growth path, a decrease in
the profit share causes a reduction in the equilibrium rate of low-skill employment.
In addition, increases in the facilitating labor share of income leads to a reduction in
the proportion of high-skill workers involved in the production of output. This
directly causes a reduction in average productivity.
The model is consistent with the idea that increases in the level of rent
seeking cause a redistribution of high-skill workers towards facilitating rent seeking
activities. If students respond strongly to post graduation employment
opportunities, one should expect to see a response in the composition of
undergraduate degree completions by major and in the number of students
pursuing degrees. Looking at the composition of degree completions may be a
reasonable indicator of the level of rent seeking in an economy.

D. Empirical Approach
The empirical approach is similar to that used by Murphy et al. (1991). In
72

their paper, they run two cross-sectional regressions, one for a set of 91 countries,
and the other for a set of 55 countries that have more than 10,000 students enrolled.
However, using a cross-country sample can be problematic. The main objection to
using cross-country data is that the countries in the sample are heterogeneous in
terms of their culture, laws, currency, and more, making unobserved variables a
potentially large source of error (Crain and Lee, 1999). When it comes to
postsecondary majors and enrollment, these differences may be exacerbated by
poor data collection and differing standards of postsecondary education. For these
reasons, this paper uses a sample of the 48 contiguous states to run both a crosssectional regression and panel regressions.

1. Cross Sectional Regression
To test the “long-run” impacts of the allocation of talent, a cross-sectional
analysis is performed on the 48 contiguous states, using the average growth rate of
real personal income per capita over the time period 1990-2010 as the dependent
variable. This type of regression follows Barro (1991), Murphy et al. (1991), Glaeser,
Sheinkeman and Shleifer (1995), along with many others. This type of regression
takes the form:
avgYˆ = β 0 + β1 lnYi + β 2 Si + β3 Ri + β 4 Xi + avgGi + ε i

Where avgYˆ is the average growth rate of real personal income per capita, β 0 is the
constant term, lnYi is the initial level of real personal income per capita, Ri is the
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initial composition of postsecondary degree completions in rent seeking related
majors, Si is the initial composition of postsecondary degree completions in STEM
related majors, Xi is a measure of the initial level of educational attainment in state i,
and avgGi is a measure of the average level of government expenditures over the
entire time period.

2. Panel Regression
Cross-sectional analyses fail to properly account for variables that change
over time and to control for country or state level variation. Moving to panel
analysis allows for the control of time invariant differences between states. Between
1990 and 2010, annual data exists for the United States but it is not clear that
contemporaneous values of state level controls should have contemporaneous
growth effects in this case.5 Instead, levels of the explanatory variables likely have
long-run effects. This tension between variables’ short-run and long-run effects on
growth means that there is still information to be gleaned from a cross-sectional
analysis, especially when the sample of the 48 states is relatively homogenous when
compared to a large sample of countries.
To control for time invariant unobserved state characteristics and cyclical
fluctuations, a panel regression using five-year averages of the growth rate and

5

Panel regressions that use annual data yield similar results.
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initial values of the explanatory variables between 1990 and 2010 is used.6 This
type of regression takes the form:

avgYˆit = β 0 + β1 lnYit + β 2 Sit + β 3 Rit + β 4 Xit + β 5 avgGit + ci + ε i
Where avgYˆit is the five year average of the growth rate of real personal income per
capita in state i for five year period t, lnYit is the initial value of the natural log of
real personal income per capita in state i at the beginning of period t, Sit is the value
of the proportion of bachelor’s degrees awarded in STEM related fields of study in
state i at the beginning of period t, Rit is the value of the proportion of bachelor’s
degrees awarded in rent related fields of study in state i at the beginning of period t,

Xit is a measure of educational attainment in state i at the beginning of period t,
avgGi is a measure of the average level of government consumption over each fiveyear period and ci is a vector of time invariant unobservable factors.

3. Labor Mobility
One potentially significant problem with using postsecondary degree
completions as a measure of rent seeking is the relatively high level of labor
mobility and the free flow of capital and ideas across state lines in the United States.
This raises concerns that postsecondary degree recipients may be making education
decisions based on economic conditions in other states. However, if students tend to
Initial values are used to more closely estimate the long-run findings of the
theoretical model. Using the five-year average of the percentage of STEM related
and Rent related degrees yield similar results.
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go to college in a different state than where they intend to seek employment upon
graduation, there would not be much to say about why the number of students
completing degrees in a state would impact economic growth.
Fortunately, students do tend to reside and work in the state in which they
get their undergraduate degree. One year after graduation, 85% of college graduates
continue to reside in the state where they received their undergraduate degree. By
year five, 70% of students remain in the state in which they graduate (Kodrzycki,
2001)7. To help further ease concerns that outmigration is a problem; regressions
for only public postsecondary institutions are run. This reduces the problem of
outmigration, as public colleges tend to have higher instate enrollment than private
colleges, due to their proximity and reduced instate tuition.8
To further quell concerns of outmigration, a difference in differences
regression popularized by Card and Krueger (1994) is run. In this case, there is no
policy change that is analyzed. Instead, the employment shock during the dot-com
bubble is used as a quasi-natural experiment to analyze the impact of an
employment bubble tied to an industry on the composition of degree completions.
The difference in difference estimation technique takes the form of:

College graduate retention rates vary by state.
this paper does not make the claim that students need to employed in
the state upon graduation or in a field related to their major to have the composition
of degree completions be a valid indicator of the degree of rent seeking in that state.
Instead, all that is required is that students choose their major based on possible
employment opportunities within the state in which they attend a postsecondary
institution.
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8Additionally,

CS = β 0 + β1dB + δ 0 d2 + δ 1d2dB + β 2 Xit + uit
Where CS is the proportion of computer science degrees awarded as a percentage
of all bachelor’s degrees awarded, β 0 is a constant, dB is a dummy variable that is
equal to one if the individual/state receives the treatment of an employment boom
in computer science related industries, d2 is a dummy variable for the time period
after the treatment is administered, d2dB is an interaction term identifying the
group that receives the treatment after the treatment date, and Xit is a vector of
controls. δ 1 is the difference in differences estimator. This estimator measures the
difference in the difference of the composition of computer science majors between
the treatment and control groups before and after the treatment date (Wooldridge,
2007).

4. Data
The primary data source for this paper comes from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) surveys of Institutional
Characteristics and Degree Completions. This is a very rich and complete source of
data, as all institutions of higher education classified as Title IV institutions are
required to participate in the IPEDS program. The Institutional Characteristics
Survey and the Completions survey from the IPEDS database are used to construct
the data.
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The Institutional Characteristics Survey contains a vast array of information
regarding all postsecondary institutions. The components gathered include a unique
ID code and name of all reporting institutions, the affiliation of the institution
(whether or not it is public, private nonprofit, or private for-profit), the sector of the
institution (whether it is less than 2 year, 2-4 year, or 4 year or higher), the state or
US territory the institution is located in, the highest level of degree offered, the
institution level, and the region of the institution. All institutions that are less than
two-year institutions are removed from this dataset. This leaves a list of all degree
granting institutions in the United States with programs of two years or more.
The completions survey includes a list of degrees conferred by field of study
at the 6-digit Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code level, the level of
the degree (associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s, Ph.D.), and the gender of the recipient
at every reporting institution. There are approximately 1,000 unique majors
identified at the 6-digit CIP level that fit into 42 different major categories. The
complete list of major categories is available in appendix B. CIP codes were updated
in 2000 and 2010, requiring the recoding of certain degree completions at the 6digit level to ensure a consistent dataset over time. All degree completions are
reported according to their 2010 CIP code.
In the IPEDS system, each degree granting institution is given a unique
identification code. Using the Survey of Institutional Characteristics, each institution
is sorted by state. The two surveys are then merged by the unique institution ID
number, retaining the state where the institution is located, whether or not the
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institution is public or private, the number of degree completions by 2-digit CIP
code, and the level of the degree completion.
The resulting data set includes the 42 different major categories listed in
appendix B by degree level for each individual state. To keep the analysis tractable,
the 42 different major categories are segmented into two degree classifications of
interest, STEM related degrees and rent related degrees. Making such a distinction
between degrees required making some assumptions about which degrees should
be included in which categories. There is some guidance as to what majors should
be included as STEM majors, even though there is no firm consensus. In this paper, a
broad classification of STEM degrees is applied and includes degrees awarded in
agriculture, natural resources, computer science, engineering, engineering
technologies, biology, mathematics, physical sciences, and science technology. Rent
related degrees include communications, legal studies, business, and social sciences.
The remaining majors are classified as other. Using these classifications, the ratio of
degree completions to total degree completions at the bachelor’s level for STEM
degrees (STEM), rent related degrees (Rent), and other degrees (Other) are
calculated.
Ideally, in a state level growth regression the growth rate of real state
product per capita would be the dependent variable. In the case of the United States,
however, time consistent state domestic product data is not available between 1990
and 2010. During that time period, the industry classification system switched from
the Standard Industrial Classification System to the North American Industry
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Classification System. Therefore, personal income per capita collected from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is used instead. Since the personal income per
capita data is given in current dollars, the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI) is used to calculate the real personal
income per capita (RPI) for all 48 contiguous states in 2012 dollars. The growth rate
of RPI is calculated to generate the dependent variable, the growth rate of real
personal income per capita (Growth).
Researchers have run thousands of cross-sectional and panel growth
regressions using a number of different control variables. Many variables have been
found to be statistically significant in some regressions and not significant in others.
This causes a great deal of uneasiness when it comes to picking the relevant and
correct control variables. Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) have run
statistical analysis to determine what control variables tend to be significant using
Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates. In their study, they identify 67
explanatory variables used across studies and find that only 18 are significantly and
robustly partially correlated with the growth rate. This model uncertainty makes
correctly specifying the regression equation difficult, if not impossible. For this
reason, simplicity is favored over complexity and the control variable list is left
relatively short as the primary takeaway from the Sala-i-Martin et al. paper is that
initial levels of income per capita, a measure of primary schooling and government
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expenditure as a percentage of GDP, should be included in the analysis.9 Beyond
these variables, the justification of the inclusion of other controls is weak.
The most prevalent control in cross-country growth regressions is the
inclusion of the log of the initial level of GDP per capita. Nearly every long-run
growth regression includes this variable and it is found to be significant across a
vast array of studies (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). This finding that the log of the
initial level of GDP per capita is significant has sometimes been referred to as the
“iron law of convergence” (Barro, 2012). For this reason, the log of real personal
income per capita is included as a control.
As has been suggested in the cross-country growth literature, starting with
Barro (1992), measures of human capital have been shown to contribute
significantly to the growth rate of the country. This has led researchers to include a
number of different measures of human capital in their growth regressions. In the
Sala-i-Martin et al. study of the robustness of control variables, it is found that the
enrollment rate of individuals of primary school age should be included in long-run
growth regressions. In the United States, however, it should not be expected to be an
important a measure of differences in human capital across states due to the
prevalence of compulsory education requirements. Because primary school
enrollment rates do not vary much across states, a measure of postsecondary
schooling (Ba’s/Population) is more sufficient. To construct this parameter, the total
For a discussion on the effects of government consumption on growth, see Bergh and
Henrekson (2011).
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number of undergraduates obtaining a bachelor’s degree in the state in a given year
and dividing it by the state’s population of 18-24 year olds.
To construct a measure of government consumption, data is obtained on the
level of state government expenditure from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of
Government Finances, starting in 1990. The data is transformed into 2012 dollars
using the consumer price index. The difference in real state expenditure and real
state education expenditure is used to calculate real state non-education
expenditure as a percentage of real personal income (Gov. Spending) as a measure
of state level government expenditures. Summary statistics for the full sample for
the entire time period 1990-2013 are presented in table 1.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Obs. Mean
Growth
1008 0.012
STEM
1008 0.179
Rent
1008 0.354
lnRPI
1008 10.519
Gov. Spending
1008 0.120
Ba’s/Population
1008 0.052

S.D.
0.023
0.027
0.044
0.170
0.025
0.014

Min
-0.115
0.115
0.224
10.058
0.073
0.019

Max
.099
0.306
0.515
11.048
0.207
0.108

5. Trends in Postsecondary Degree Completions
The data set employed in this paper tracks bachelors degree completions in
the 48 contiguous states between 1990 and 2010. Over this time period, there has
been fairly robust growth in the total number of bachelor’s degrees awarded by all
title IV postsecondary institutions with the exception being between 1994 and 1997
when the level of bachelor’s degree completions was flat (figure 1). Decomposing
the total number of degree completions by type reveals that this slow down in the
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Figure 1: Total BA Degree Completions for the 48 Contiguous States

Figure 2: Total BA Degree Completions for the 48 Contiguous States by Type
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rate of growth of degree completions was a result of a decrease in the number of
rent seeking related degrees awarded between 1993 and 1997 while the overall
trend in other degrees was relatively constant over the same time period (figure 2).
The overall trend in degree completions is similar for the sample of only
public postsecondary institutions. However, the reduction in public bachelors
degree completions is more pronounced than the reduction in the sample as a whole
(figure 3). As was true for the public school sample, the reduction in growth of the
total number of degree completions was caused by a significant reduction in rent
related degree completions while non-rent related degree completions continued to
grow at the same rate (figure 4).
The composition of degree completions shows similar trends when all
schools are included and when only private schools are included in the national
dataset (figures 5 and 6). In both cases, the composition of rent related degree
completions fluctuates between 30% and 40% with STEM related degree
completions comprising only 10% to 20% of total degree completions.
Even though the national trend follows a pattern, there is a significant
amount of variation in the composition of degree completions at the state level.
Figure 7 shows the composition of public degree completions for the states of
California, Colorado, Massachusetts and Vermont. The composition of degree
completions in California and Massachusetts are similar but the composition of
degree completions in Colorado and Vermont are noticeably different. Colorado is
the only state in the subsample that has the proportion of rent related degrees
84

Figure 3: Public School BA Degree Completions for the 48 Contiguous States

Figure 4: Public School BA Degree Completions for the 48 Contiguous States by Type
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Figure 5: Composition of Total Degree Completions for the 48 Contiguous States

Figure 6: Composition of Public School Degree Completions for the 48 Contiguous
States
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Figure 7: Composition of Public School BA Degree Completions for Selected States

above the proportion of “other” degrees while Vermont graduates a very large
number of “other” degrees relative to the other states in the subsample.

E. Results
The Rent variable is an indicator of the level of rent seeking and does not
necessarily suggest that increasing the proportion of college graduates in rent
related fields causes a change in the growth rate. Instead, the interpretation of the
Rent variable is that changes in the level of rent seeking cause changes in both the
proportion of degree completions, and the growth rate. This does not exclude the
possibility that more traditional human capital channels of growth may be playing
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an important role in determining the growth rate, especially when longer run
regressions are considered.
1. Cross Sectional Regression Results
The cross-sectional regression considers how the initial levels of all of the
explanatory variables influence the average growth rate over the entire period from
1990-2010. Table 2 shows the regression results of the cross-sectional regression
for the sample of public schools10 and shows the long-run effects of changes in the
explanatory variables. For a preliminary glimpse at the results, a scatter plot
showing the relationship between the percentage of rent related degree
completions at public schools and the average growth rate between 1990 and 2010
is shown in figure 8.
As can be seen in the figure, states that graduate a higher proportion of
students with rent related degrees tended to grow more slowly between 1990 and
2010. When regressions are run including controls, the sign on the initial proportion
of rent related degree completions is negative and significant in regressions 2-4.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that states that initially have an environment
conducive to rent seeking see real personal income per capita grow more slowly
than states that have an environment that is less conducive to rent seeking.
The sign on the coefficient for the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded as a
percentage of the population aged 18-24 is positive and significant at the 5% level in
regressions 3 and 4. The initial level of the log of real personal income per capita is
10

See appendix C for the regression results for the full sample of title IV schools.
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significant and negative at the 1% level in regression 1. However, it is only
significant at the 5% level in regression 2, the 10% level in regression 3 and is
insignificant in regression 4. The initial level of STEM graduates and the initial level
of government consumption expenditures are not significant at the 10% level.
Figure 8: Relationship Between Rent Related Degree Completions and Average
Growth 1990-2010

Due to the long time period examined it is not possible to separate the effect
changes in rent seeking have on average growth from more traditional human
capital channels as this specification is consistent with either interpretation. Over
the very long run, higher proportions of rent related degree completions may
reduce growth by reducing the composition of skills that foster innovation and
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therefore growth. This reduction in the composition of skills may be the result of the
increased returns to rent seeking. However, it should be noted that, over the long
run, simply increasing the proportion of degree completions to the size of the
college aged population has a positive effect on the long run average growth rate
consistent with traditional human capital theories.
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Regressions for Public Schools
Dependent variable: average growth rate of real personal income per capita 1990-2010

(1)
-0.010***
(0.003)

(2)
-0.007**
(0.003)
0.002
(0.023)
-0.046***
(0.013)

(3)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.018
(0.024)
-0.039***
(0.011)
0.156**
(0.067)

(4)
lnRPI
-0.006
(0.004)
STEM
-0.019
(0.024)
Rent
-0.040***
(0.013)
Ba's/Population
0.156**
(0.067)
Gov. Spending
-0.003
(0.022)
Constant
0.118***
0.098***
0.086**
0.088**
(0.032)
(0.034)
(0.035)
(0.040)
Obs
48
48
48
48
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***p<.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
2. Five Year Average Panel Regression Results
Table 3 shows the results of the panel regressions using the five-year average
of the growth rate as the dependent variable between 1990 and 2010. The initial
values of the log of real personal income per capita, the proportion of STEM degree
completions, the proportion of rent seeking related degree completions, and the
number of bachelor’s degrees awarded as a percentage of the population 18-24
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years old are included as controls, along with the five-year average level of
government expenditures.
Table 3: Five-Year Average Panel Regressions for Public Schools Without Fixed
Effects
Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real personal income per capita

(5)
-0.015***
(0.003)

(6)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.028)
-0.086***
(0.016)

(7)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.029)
-0.085***
(0.016)
0.012
(0.084)

(8)
lnRPI
-0.015***
(0.004)
STEM
-0.017
(0.033)
Rent
-0.105***
(0.017)
Ba's/Population
0.024
(0.094)
Gov. Spending
-0.078***
(0.029)
Constant
0.166***
0.169***
0.169***
0.215***
(0.031)
(0.041)
(0.041)
(0.048)
Obs
192
192
192
192
FE?
NO
NO
NO
NO
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***p<.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
Consistent with the cross-sectional regressions, the Rent variable is negative
and significant at the 1% level in random effects regressions 6-8. The coefficient on
the initial level of the log of real personal income per capita is negative and
significant at the 1% level in the random effects model. As in the cross-sectional
regression, the STEM variable does not have a significant effect on the average
growth rate of real personal income per capita. The sign on the coefficient of
Ba’s/Population is positive but not significant at the 5% level when included. The
effect of an increase in Gov. Spending on the average growth rate of real personal
income per capita is negative and significant at the 1% level.
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As was mentioned previously, the inclusion of state level fixed effects
controls for time invariant unobserved differences between states. The results of
regressions 9-12 in table 4 indicate much stronger, statistically significant effects of
the initial level of STEM and Rent related degree completions on growth than in
regressions 5-8. The magnitude of the lnRPI and degree completions as a percentage
of the college age population estimates are also significantly larger than in the
random effects regression, while the coefficient on the government spending
variable remains negative but becomes insignificant.
Table 4: Five-Year Average Panel Regressions for Public Schools With Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real personal income per capita

(9)
-0.034***
(0.005)

(10)
-0.049***
(0.008)
0.133**
(0.064)
-0.207***
(0.026)

(11)
-0.056***
(0.009)
0.172**
(0.067)
-0.177***
(0.027)
0.609**
(0.235)

(12)
lnRPI
-0.052***
(0.011)
STEM
0.181***
(0.061)
Rent
-0.179***
(0.030)
Ba's/Population
0.604**
(0.240)
Gov. Spending
-0.173
(0.126)
Constant
0.368***
0.577***
0.604***
0.581***
(0.057)
(0.091)
(0.098)
(0.101)
Obs
192
192
192
192
FE?
YES
YES
YES
YES
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
The point estimates of the effect of an increase in rent seeking represented
by the percent of college graduates in rent related majors suggest that an increase in
rent seeking that results in a one percentage point increase in the percentage of
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college graduates with a rent related major reduces the growth rate of real personal
income per capita by between 0.04 percentage points and 0.207 percentage points.
These results are consistent with what one would expect from the rent-seeking
argument, but other factors may have played a role in these results. Therefore, these
results should be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive.
Although the proportion of degree completions by major are used here as an
indicator of rent seeking, the analysis does not exclude the possibility that more
standard human capital channels are impacting the rate of growth. This is
particularly true in the cross-sectional analysis when initial levels of distributions of
degree completions are used. It could be that over the twenty years examined, the
addition of a large proportion of individuals trained in rent related fields has had a
negative impact on the growth rate, in addition to the increased levels of rent
seeking. However, this human capital channel is less plausible in the panel
regression, as human capital channels may take a substantial period of time to have
growth effects.
3. State Spillovers
To be clear, the employment shock that occurs in certain states and not in
others is not the result of an explicit policy change, but rather a change in the
expansion of industries related to the five computer information and computer
systems design industries identified by Hecker (2005). These industries include
software publishers, internet publishing and broadcasting, internet service
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providers and web search portals, data processing, hosting, and related services,
and computer systems design and related services.
Table 5: Difference in Difference Estimates for Public Schools
Dependent Variable: composition of computer science degree completions
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
Diff in Diff
0.004**
0.004**
0.005***
0.005***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Treatment
0.000
0.002
0.001
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Post 1994
0.002***
0.003***
0.004***
0.004***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
lnRPI
-0.008**
-0.008**
-0.008**
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Growth
-0.077***
-0.073***
(0.023)
(0.022)
Ba's/Population
-0.115**
(0.057)
Gov. Spending
Constant
Obs

0.020***
(0.001)

0.100***
(0.037)
420

0.104***
(0.037)
420

0.106***
(0.036)
420

(17)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.011***
(0.003)
-0.078***
(0.022)
-0.101*
(0.055)
-0.066***
(0.015)
0.148***
(0.035)
420

Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
What is interesting about these industries is that the magnitude of the
change in employment varied dramatically across the 48 contiguous states. In fact,
the majority of the increase in employment in these industries as a percent of total
state employment occurred in just 9 states: California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. There was very
little to negative growth in these five computer related industries over the entire
sample period in nineteen other states: Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
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Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming.
To examine the effect of an employment shock in computer science related
industries identified by Hecker (2005), the sample of 48 states is separated into a
control group, a treatment group, and an omitted group. States that experience a 1
percentage point increase in the composition of computer science related
employment are put into the treatment group. States that experience less than a 0.5
percentage point increase in the composition of computer science related
employment are placed into the control group. The treatment and control groups
are listed in appendix D.
As can be seen from figure 9, on average, the treatment group experiences a
very strong expansion in the composition of computer science related employment.
In addition, although the treatment group shows an increase in the average
composition of computer science employment, the trends in employment prior to
the shock in 1994 are broadly similar in both the treatment and the control groups.
After 1994, the trends in the composition of employment diverge significantly.
The results of this divergence can be seen in figure 10 for the entire sample
of Title IV schools, and in figure 11 for just public schools. In the sample as a whole,
there is a significant increase in the composition of computer science degree
completions in both the treatment and the control groups. However, the difference
in the composition of computer science degree completions between the treatment
group and the control group is increasing over time. Between 1994 and 2004, the
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Figure 9: Average Percent Computer Science Employment

Figure 10: Average Percent Computer Science BA’s for All Schools
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difference between the treatment and control group increases by almost a full
percentage point. In the public school sample, this increase is more than twice as
large and suggests that the problem of employment spillovers is reduced, but not
entirely eliminated by looking at a sample that includes only public schools. The
difference in the trends of the private and public school sample’s composition of
computer science degree completions over time is shown in figure 12.
A set of difference in difference regressions with controls are run to test the
statistical significance of the difference in the trends prior to and after the
employment shock. Regressions 13-17 show that the difference in differences
estimator is positive and significant at the 5% level in the public schools sample. The
point estimate suggests that after the employment shock, the treatment group
experienced an increase in the composition of computer science majors that was
0.4-0.5 percentage points greater than the increase in the control group. Although
relatively small, it represents approximately 16.7 to 20.9 percent of the 2.39
percentage point increase in the composition of computer science degree
completions over the control group.

F. Conclusions
This paper has presented theoretical and empirical evidence consistent with
the argument that increases in the level of rent seeking may result in the reduction
of state level growth in real personal income per capita. Using the composition of
degree completions as an indicator of the level of rent seeking, it was found that
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Figure 11: Average Percent Computer Science BA’s for Public Schools

Figure 12: Difference in Percent Computer Science BA Degrees

98

increased levels of rent seeking correspond with lower state level growth. This
result is robust to different econometric specifications.
There are two theoretical mechanisms that are consistent with the empirical
findings. First, increases in rent seeking can slow growth through a redistribution of
income, as an increase in rent seeking is a cost to firms. The derived effect of this
redistribution on income distribution is an increase in the facilitating labor share, a
decrease in the profit share, and a corresponding decrease in the wage share.
Since capitalists have higher saving rates than high-skill workers, as income
is redistributed to facilitating labor, the saving rate falls, causing a reduction in the
long-run rate of low-skill employment. Second, increased rent seeking increases the
proportion of the population involved in rent seeking activities as facilitating labor.
This lowers average productivity.
It should be stressed that although the empirical results in this paper are
consistent with the theoretical model, they are far from conclusive. Future research
in this area should focus on constructing a measure of rent seeking that more closely
proxies for rent seeking conditions in a given state or country. Such a measure might
include instances of corruption litigation, instances of intellectual property
litigation, political donations and lobbying efforts, government subsidy outlays, the
complexity of the tax code, and measures of monopoly power. This paper should be
seen as a contribution that is consistent with the findings of the corruption
literature and not conclusive evidence that increased rent seeking reduces growth.
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With this in mind, the findings of this paper suggest that economic policy
makers should be increasingly concerned with changes in social norms and efforts
by economic agents to redistribute income towards activities that do little to
contribute to social welfare as they may lead to slower growth and influence the
acquisition of skills in an economy. Furthermore, measures aimed at decreasing the
level of rent seeking in the economy can be beneficial. Such measures could include
taxing income earned in financial markets at a higher rate, increasing taxes on
incentive based pay, and simplifying the tax code.
Beyond increasing output and low-skill employment, policies that reduce the
level of rent seeking may also alter the major selection of college undergraduates.
This finding may be relevant to policy makers that are concerned with the skills
acquired in postsecondary schools, especially as a higher proportion of
undergraduate degrees are at least partially funded through grants and subsidized
loans. In addition, it suggests that standard human capital theory may fall short in
fully explaining differences in growth rates across states, and perhaps countries, as
increases the level of human capital may be accompanied by lower than expected
growth if the composition of majors is not considered.
Although this paper makes no claims as to how the distribution of college
graduates may affect technological innovation, the ability to influence the
distribution of college graduates may be an important factor in the rate of
innovation. This is of particularly relevant to policies designed to increase the
number of STEM related college graduates. If students see post-graduation
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employment opportunities as influential in major selection, policies designed to
increase interest in STEM related fields of study may not be the best way to
influence student’s choice of major. Instead, policy makers may be able to more
effectively influence major selection by influencing post graduation employment
opportunities.
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APPENDIX A
OCCUPATION BY MAJOR
Where Majors End Up By Occupation from “What’s it Worth”
Degree

Occ. 1
(%)

Occ. 2
(%)

Occ. (3)
(%)

Occ. 4
(%)

Occ. 5
(%)

Agricultural
and Natural
Resources

MGMT
(24)

SALES
(15)

LS (8)

OFF (7)

BLDG
(4)

58%

8%

Arts

ARTS
(25)

OFF
(12)

SALES
(12)

EDU (8)

71%

0%

Biology and
Life Science

MGMT
(16)

LS (12)

SALES
(11)

OFF (8)

62%

12%

Business

MGMT
(25)

MGMT
(14)
HLTH
PROF
(15)
SALES
(18)

FIN
(18)

OFF
(12)

BUS (6)

79%

0%

MGMT
(21)

SALES
(17)

ARTS
(14)

OFF (14)

EDU (7)

73%

0%

COMP
(46)

MGMT
(16)

OFF (7)

SALES
(6)

BUS (4)

79%

46%

EDU
(54)
ENGR
(32)
HLTH
PROF
(69)

MGMT
(9)
MGMT
(22)

BUS (3)

81%

0%

ARCH
(4)

74%

45%

MGMT
(8)

OFF (4)

SALES
(3)

HLTH
SUP (3)

87%

0%

MGMT
(18)

OFF
(15)

SALES
(14)

EDU
(11)

ARTS
(6)

64%

0%

MGMT
(22)

SALES
(12)

EDU (9)

TRAN
(8)

OFF (7)

58%

0%

PROT
(32)

MGMT
(11)

OFF
(11)

SALES
(8)

71%

0%

MGMT
(18)

SALES
(11)

LS (10)

OFF (8)

57%

10%

COMM
(18)

MGMT
(16)

OFF
(15)

SALES
(11)

EDU (8)

68%

0%

MGMT
(22)

SALES
(16)

OFF
(13)

FIN (7)

BUS (6)

64%

0%

Communicati
ons and
Journalism
Computers
and
Mathematics
Education
Engineering
Health
Humanities
and Liberal
Arts
Industrial
Arts and
Consumer
Services
Law and
Public Policy
Physical
Sciences
Psychology
andSocial
Work
Social
Science

OFF (9)
COMP
(9)

SALES
(6)
SALES
(7)

COMM
(9)
HLTH
PROF
(10)
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Total %

% STEM

APPENDIX B
COMPLETE LIST OF MAJOR CATEGORIES
Agriculture, Agriculture Operations, and Related Sciences
Natural Resources and Conservation
Architecture and Related Services
Area, Ethnic, Cultural, Gender, and Group Studies
Communication, Journalism, and Related Programs
Communications Technologies/Technicians and Support Services
Computer and Information Sciences and Support Services
Personal and Culinary Services
Education
Engineering
Engineering Technologies and Engineering-Related Fields
Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics
Family and Consumer Sciences/Human Sciences
Legal Professions and Studies
English Language and Literature/Letters
Liberal Arts and Sciences, General Studies, and Humanities
Library Science
Biological and Biomedical Sciences
Mathematics and Statistics
Military Science, Leadership and Operational Art
Military Technologies and Applied Sciences
Multi/Interdisciplinary Studies
Parks, Recreation, Leisure, and Fitness Studies
Philosophy and Religious Studies
Theology and Religious Studies
Physical Sciences
Science Technologies/Technicians
Psychology
Homeland Security, Law Enforcement, Firefighting and Related Protective Services
Public Administration and Social Service Professions
Social Sciences
Construction Trades
Mechanic and Repair Technologies/Technicians
Precision Production
Transportation and Materials Moving
Visual and Performing Arts
Health Professions and Related Programs
Business, Management, Marketing, and Related Support Services
High School/Secondary Diplomas and Certificates
History
Residency Programs
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APPENDIX C
FULL SAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 6: Cross Sectional Regressions for All Schools
Dependent variable: average growth rate of real personal income per capita
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
lnRPI
-0.011***
-0.005*
-0.007**
-0.008**
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
STEM
0.005
0.008
0.007
(0.026)
(0.024)
(0.024)
Rent
-0.048***
-0.041**
-0.043***
(0.018)
(0.016)
(0.016)
Ba's/Population
0.127**
0.128**
(0.051)
(0.053)
Gov. Spending
-0.007
(0.026)
Constant
0.128***
0.086***
0.097***
0.102**
(0.036)
(0.027)
(0.031)
(0.038)
Obs
48
48
48
48
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
Table 7: Five-Year Average Panel Regression For All Schools Without Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real personal income per
capita
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
lnRPI
-0.015***
-0.010***
-0.012***
-0.015***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.004)
STEM
0.022
0.027
0.017
(0.032)
(0.033)
(0.035)
Rent
-0.073***
-0.069***
-0.087***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.018)
Ba's/Population
0.070
0.081
(0.049)
(0.055)
Gov. Spending
-0.076***
(0.028)
Constant
0.166***
0.144***
0.157***
0.199***
(0.031)
(0.035)
(0.036)
(0.043)
Obs
192
192
192
192
FE?
NO
NO
NO
NO
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
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Table 8: Five-Year Average Panel Regressions for All Schools With Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real personal income per
capita
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
lnRPI
-0.034***
-0.047***
-0.059***
-0.055***
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.013)
STEM
0.091
0.139*
0.139*
(0.073)
(0.080)
(0.077)
Rent
-0.236***
-0.201***
-0.205***
(0.031)
(0.033)
(0.036)
Ba's/Population
0.413**
0.395**
(0.162)
(0.169)
Gov. Spending
-0.146
(0.131)
Constant
0.368***
0.575***
0.654***
0.634***
(0.057)
(0.089)
(0.108)
(0.113)
Obs
192
192
192
192
FE?
YES
YES
YES
YES
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
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APPENDIX D
TREATMENT AND CONTROL STATES
Treatment

Control

California
Colorado
Delaware
Georgia
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Utah
Virginia
Washington

Alabama
Arkansas
Idaho
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Mississippi
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

106

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, Daron. 1995. “Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent.” European
Economic Review 39 (1): 17–33.
Auerbach, Paul, and Peter Skott. 2000. “Skill Asymmetries, Increasing Wage Inequality
and Unemployment.” Working Paper 2000-18, Department of Economics, University
of Aarhus.
American Intellectual Property Law Association. 2001. “Report of Economic Survey,”
Washington, D.C.
Baik, Kyung Hwan. 1999. “Rent-Seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of
Monopoly.” Economic Inquiry 37 (3): 541–53.
Baron, Matthew D., Jonathan Brogaard, Björn Hagströmer, and Andrei A. Kirilenko. 2016.
“Risk and Return in High-Frequency Trading.” Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433118
Barro, Robert J. 1991. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106 (2): 407–43. doi:10.2307/2937943.
_________. 2012. “Convergence And Modernization Revisited.” Working Paper Series. No.
18295
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. “Convergence.” Journal of Political
Economy 100 (2): 223–51.
Barro, Robert J., Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Olivier Jean Blanchard, and Robert E Hall. 1991.
“Convergence Across States and Regions.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
1991 (1): 107–82.
Bassanini, A, and S Scarpetta. 2001. “Does Human Capital Matter For Growth In Oecd
Countries? Evidence From Pooled Mean-Group Estimates Economics Department
Working Papers No. 282.” Working Papers- Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Economics Department, no. 282.
Baumol, William J. 1990. “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive.”
Journal of Political Economy 98 (5): 893–921.
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Jesse M. Fried. 2005. “Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 17 (4): 8–23.

107

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Jesse M. Fried. 2009. “Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem.” In The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, edited by Randall S.
Kroszner and Louis Putterman, 327–45. Third edition. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Biais, Bruno, Thierry Foucault, and Sophie Moinas. 2015. “Equilibrium Fast Trading.”
Journal of Financial Economics 116 (2): 292–313.
Bizjak, John M., Michael L. Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen. 2008. “Does the Use of Peer
Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient Compensation?” Journal of
Financial Economics 90 (2): 152–68.
Bladen, V. W. 1960. “Adam Smith on Productive and Unproductive Labour: A Theory of
Full Development.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26 (4):
625–30.
Boldrin, Michele, and David K. Levine. 2004. “Rent-Seeking and Innovation.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 51 (1): 127–60.
_________. 2013. “The Case against Patents.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (1): 3–22.
Brogaard, Jonathan, Bjorn Hagstromer, Lars Norden, and Ryan Riordan. 2015. “Trading
Fast and Slow: Colocation and Liquidity.” Review of Financial Studies 28 (12): 3407–
43.
Brou, Daniel, and Michele Ruta. 2013. “Rent-Seeking, Market Structure, and Growth.”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115 (3): 878–901.
Brumm, Harold .J. 1999. Rent seeking and economic growth: evidence from the States.
The Cato Journal 19: 7–16.
Buchanan, James M. 1980. “Rent seeking and profit seeking.” Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society /
Edited by James M. Buchanan.

Budish, Eric, Peter Cramton, and John Shim. 2015. “The High-Frequency Trading Arms
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response*.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 130 (4): 1547-1621
Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 1994. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.” American Economic
Review 84 (4): 772–93.
Caselli, Francesco. 2005. “Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences.” Handbooks
In Economics 1A (22): 679–742.

108

Ciena Corporation. “Ultra-Low-Latency Networking”. Ciena.com.
http://www.ciena.com/solutions/enterprise/ultra-low-latency-networking/
(accessed June 2, 2016)
"Citadel Careers." Citadel Careers. Citadel Group. http://www.citadelgroup.com/careers/
Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and Raghavendra P. Rau. 2014. “Performance for Pay?
The Relation Between CEO Incentive Compensation and Future Stock Price
Performance” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572085
Cowling, Keith, and Dennis C Mueller. 1978. “The Social Costs of Monopoly Power.” The
Economic Journal 88 (352): 727–48.
Crain, W. Mark, and Katherine J. Lee. 1999. “Economic Growth Regressions for the
American States: A Sensitivity Analysis.” Economic Inquiry 37 (2): 242–57.
Crotty, James. 2009. "The Bonus-Driven ‘Rainmaker’ Financial Firm: How These Firms
Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial
Instability," Working Papers, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of
Economics.
Dillard, Dudley. 1984. “Keynes and Marx: A Centennial Appraisal.” Journal of Post
Keynesian Economics 6 (3): 421–32.
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions
and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.”
Econometrica 64 (5): 1001–44.
Dasgupta, Partha, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1980. "Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the
Speed of R&D". The Bell Journal of Economics. 11 (1): 1-28.
Duménil, Gérard, and Dominique Lévy. 2011. “Unproductive Labor as Profit-RateMaximizing Labor.” Rethinking Marxism 23 (2): 216–25.
Durlauf, Steven N, and Danny T Quah. 1999. “The New Empirics of Economic Growth.”
Handbook of Macroeconomics / Edited by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford.
Dutt, Amitava K. 1984. “Stagnation, Income Distribution and Monopoly Power.”
Cambridge Journal of Economics 8 (1): 25–40.
Dutt, Amitava K., and Roberto Veneziani. 2015. “A Classical Model of Education, Growth
and Distribution” Unpublished. Available at
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/v_2015_10_24_veneziani.pdf.

109

Ebeke, Christian, Luc Desire Omgba, and Rachid Laajaj. 2015. “Oil, Governance and the
(Mis)allocation of Talent in Developing Countries.” Journal of Development
Economics 114 (May): 126–41.
Edlin, Aaron S., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1995. “Discouraging Rivals: Managerial RentSeeking and Economic Inefficiencies.” The American Economic Review 85 (5): 1301–
12.
Fama, Eugene F., and Arthur B. Laffer. 1971. “Information and Capital Markets.” Journal
of Business 44 (3): 289–98.
Flaschel, Peter, and Peter Skott. 2006. “Steindlian Models of Growth and Stagnation.”
Metroeconomica 57 (3): 303–38.
Foucault, Thierry Roman Kozhan, and Wing Wah Tham. 2016. “Toxic Arbitrage.” HEC
Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2014-1040. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409054
Frank, Mark W. 2009a. “Income Inequality, Human Capital, and Income Growth: Evidence
from a State-Level VAR Analysis.” Atlantic Economic Journal 37 (2): 173–85.
_________. 2009b. “Inequality And Growth In The United States: Evidence From A New
State-Level Panel Of Income Inequality Measures.” Economic Inquiry 47 (1): 55–68.
Fulghieri, Paolo, and Laurie Simon Hodrick. 2006. “Synergies and Internal Agency
Conflicts: The Double-Edged Sword of Mergers.” Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 15 (3): 549–76.
Gans, Joshua S., and Scott Stern. 2010. “Is There a Market for Ideas?” Industrial and
Corporate Change 19 (3): 805–37.
Gelb, Alan H., John B. Knight, and Richard H. Sabot. 1991. “Public Sector Employment,
Rent Seeking and Economic Growth.” The Economic Journal 101 (408): 1186–99.
Gillan, Stuart. 2001. “Has Pay for Performance Gone Awry? Views From a Corporate
Governance Forum.” Research Dialogue, Vol. 68
Glaeser, Edward L, and Raven E Saks. 2006. “Corruption in America.” Journal of Public
Economics 90 (6-7): 1053–72.
Glaeser, Edward L., José A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer. 1995. “Economic Growth in
a Cross-Section of Cities.” Journal of Monetary Economics Journal of Monetary
Economics 36 (1): 117–43.
Gough, Ian. 1972. “Marx’s Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour.” New Left
Review I/76: 47–72.
110

Hagiu, Andrei, and David B. Yoffie. 2013. “The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms,
Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27
(1): 45–66.
Hall, Bronwyn H, Stuart J. H Graham, Dietmar Harhoff, and David C. Mowery. 2003.
“Prospects For Improving U.S. Patent Quality Via Post-Grant Opposition.” Working
Paper Series. no. 9731
Harberger, Arnold C. 1964. “The Measurement of Waste.” American Economic Review 54
(May): 58–76.
Harrod, Roy F. 1939. “An Essay in Dynamic Theory.” The Economic Journal, 49 (193): 14–
33.
Hecker, Daniel E. 2005. “High-Technology Employment: A NAICS-Based Update.” Monthly
Labor Review 128 (7): 57–72.
Hillman, Arye L. 2008. “Political Economy and Political Correctness.” In 40 Years of
Research on Rent Seeking: Volume 2, edited by Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman,
and Kai A. Konrad, 791–811. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer.
_________. 2013. “Rent Seeking.” In Reksulak, Michael, Laura Razzolini, William F Shughart
II (Eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, Cheltenham UK and
Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 307–330.
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1971. “The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity.” American Economic Review 61 (4): 561–74.
Inderst, Roman, Holger M. Muller, and Karl Warneryd. 2007. “Distributional Conflict in
Organizations.” European Economic Review 51 (2): 385–402.
Jarrow R.A, and Protter P. 2012. “A Dysfunctional Role of High Frequency Trading in
Electronic Markets.” International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 15 (3).
Jayadev, Arjun, and Samuel Bowles. 2006. “Guard Labor.” Journal of Development
Economics 79 (2): 328–48.
Johnson, Noel D, Courtney L LaFountain, and Steven Yamarik. 2011. “Corruption Is Bad
for Growth (even in the United States).” Public Choice 147 (3-4): 3–4.
Jones, Charles M. 2013. “What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading?” Columbia
Business School Research Paper No. 13-11. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236201

111

Kesan, Jay P. and Gwendolyn G. Ball. 2006. “How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes.”
Washington University Law Review 84 (2): 237-312.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
London: Macmillan and Co., limited.
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian. 2011. “Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial
Markets.” Annual Review of Economics 3 (1): 579–600.
Kimenyi, Mwangi S, and John M Mbaku. 1993. “Rent-Seeking and Institutional Stability in
Developing Countries.” Public Choice 77 (2): 385–405.
Kodrzycki, Yolanda K. 2001. “Migration of Recent College Graduates: Evidence from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.” New England Economic Review: 13–34.
Krueger, Anne O. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” The
American Economic Review 64 (3): 291–303.
Lemley, Mark A., and Carl Shapiro. 2005. “Probabilistic Patents.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 19 (2): 75–98.
Levine, D.M. 2013. "A Day In The Quiet Life Of A NYSE Floor Trader." CNNMoney.
http://fortune.com/2013/05/29/a-day-in-the-quiet-life-of-a-nyse-floor-trader/
Lewis, W. Arthur. 1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour.” The
Manchester School 22 (2): 139–91.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N Weil. 1992. “A Contribution to the
Empirics of Economic Growth.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2): 407–37.
Manzoor, Sarfraz. 2013. “Quants: The Maths Geniuses Running Wall Street,” July 23, sec.
Finance. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10188335/Quants-the-mathsgeniuses-running-Wall-Street.html.
Marglin, Stephen and Amit Bhaduri. 1990. “Profit Squeeze and Keynesian Theory.” In
Marglin, Stephen and Juliet Shor (eds): The Golden Age of Capitalism – Reinterpreting
the Postwar Experience, Clarendon, Oxford.
Marx, Karl, and Ernest Mandel. 1992. Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy.
Translated by Ben Fowkes. Reprint edition. London; New York, N.Y: Penguin
Classics.
Merges, Robert. 2009. “The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent
Law Reform.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal, January, 1583–1614.

112

Milgrom, Paul R. 1988. “Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient
Organization Design.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 42–60.
Miller, Shawn P. 2014. “Fuzzy Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim Construction
Reversal Rates” Stanford Technology Law Review 17 (3): 809-841.
Mohun, Simon. 2014. “Unproductive Labor in the U.S. Economy 1964-2010.” Review of
Radical Political Economics 46 (3): 355–79.
Mossoff, Adam. 2015. “Patent Licensing and Secondary Markets in the Nineteenth
Century.” George Mason Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 4, Forthcoming Summer 2015;
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 15-17. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602902
Mullainathan, Sendhil. 2015. “Why a Harvard Professor Has Mixed Feelings When
Students Take Jobs in Finance.” The New York Times, April 10.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/upshot/why-a-harvard-professor-hasmixed-feelings-when-students-take-jobs-in-finance.html.
Murphy, Kevin M, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1991. “The Allocation of Talent:
Implications for Growth.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2): 503–30.
_________. 1993. “Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?” The American Economic
Review 83 (2): 409–14.
Nitzan, Shmuel. 1994. “Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests.” European Journal of Political
Economy 10 (1): 41–60.
Oosterbeek, Hessel, Randolph Sloof, and Joep Sonnemans. 2011. “Rent-Seeking versus
Productive Activities in a Multi-Task Experiment.” European Economic Review 55
(5): 630–43.
Perlin, Marcelo, Alfonso Dufour, and Chris Brooks. 2014. “The Determinants of a Cross
Market Arbitrage Opportunity: Theory and Evidence for the European Bond
Market.” Annals of Finance 10 (3): 457–80.
Philippon, Thomas, and Ariell Reshef. 2012. “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Finance Industry: 1909-2006.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (4): 1551–
1609.
_________. 2013. “An International Look at the Growth of Modern Finance.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 27 (2): 73–96.
Pooler, David. 2004. “Rent Seeking: A Review of the Work of Krueger and Tullock.” The
Saskatchewan Economics Journal 6: 63–76.

113

Posner, Richard A. 1975. “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.” Journal of
Political Economy 83 (4): 807–27.
"Prediction Company: Openings." Prediction Company: Openings. Prediction Company
LLC.. http://www.predict.com/openings.html.
Rajan, Raghuram, Henri Servaes, and Luigi Zingales. 2000. “The Cost of Diversity: The
Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment.” The Journal of Finance 55 (1):
35–80.
Robinson, Joan. 1962. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. London; New York:
Macmillan; St Martin’s Press.
Roth, Alvin E. 2008. “What Have We Learned from Market Design?*.” The Economic
Journal 118 (527): 285–310.
Rowthorne, Bob. 1981. Demand Real Wages and Economic Growth. Thames Polytechnic.
Ryoo, Soon, and Peter Skott. 2013. “Public Debt and Full Employment in a Stock-Flow
Consistent Model of a Corporate Economy.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 35
(4): 511–28.
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, Gernot Doppelhofer, and Ronald I Miller. 2004. “Determinants of
Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach.”
American Economic Review 94 (4): 813–35.
Scharfstein, David S., and Jeremy C. Stein. 2000. “The Dark Side of Internal Capital
Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment.” The Journal of Finance
55 (6): 2537–64.
Schoonjans, Bilitis, Philippe van Cauwenberge, Catherine Reekmans, and Gudrun
Simoens. 2011. “A Survey of Tax Compliance Costs of Flemish SMEs: Magnitude and
Determinants.” Environ. Plann. C Gov. Policy Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy 29 (4): 605–21.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1947. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York; London:
Harper & Brothers.
Securities and Exchange Commission. 2005. Regulation NMS. File No. S7-10-04, June 9,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf
Shapiro, Carl. 2001. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting.” NBER, January, 119–50.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1989. “Management Entrenchment: The Case of
Manager-Specific Investments.” Journal of Financial Economics 25 (1): 123–39.
114

Skott, Peter. 1989. Conflict and Effective Demand in Economic Growth. Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press.
_________. 2012. “Theoretical and Empirical Shortcomings of the Kaleckian Investment
Function.” Metroeconomica 63 (1): 109–38.
Skott, Peter, and Ben Zipperer. 2012. “An empirical evaluation of three post-Keynesian
models.” EJEEP European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention 9
(2): 277–308.
Slemrod, Joel B., and Marsha Blumenthal. 1996. “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big
Business.” Public Finance Review 24 (4): 411–38.
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New
York: The Modern Library, 1937.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (1): 65–94.
Sonin, Konstantin. 2003. “Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights.”
Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4): 715–31.
Steiner, Christopher. 2010. “Wall Street’s Speed War.” Forbes. September 9.
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0927/outfront-netscape-jim-barksdaledaniel-spivey-wall-street-speed-war.html.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2016. Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do about Them.
Tandon, Pankaj. 1984. “Innovation, Market Structure, and Welfare.” The American
Economic Review 74 (3): 394–403.
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western
Economic Journal 5 (3): 224–32.
_________. 1980. “Rent Seeking As A Negative-Sum Game.” Toward A Theory Of The RentSeeking Society / Edited by James M. Buchanan.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers” Series
CUUS0000SA0. Accessed August 14, 2014.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “QCEW Data Files: NAICS Based Data Files 1975-2013.”
http://www.bls.gov/cew/datatoc.htm. Accessed April 2015.
U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Selected Age
Groups by Sex for the United States, States, Counties, and Puerto Rico
115

Commonwealth and Municipios: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013.” Population Division,
(2014).
U.S. Census Bureau, "Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex and Age for
Multiple States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010” Population Division, Accessed August
2015.
U.S. Census Bureau, “Population Estimates for the U.S., Regions, and States by Selected
Age Groups and Sex: Annual Time series, July 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999” Population
Estimates Program, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Accessed August 2015.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “SA1-3 Personal Income Summary”
http://www.bea.gov/iTable. Accessed August 2013.
U.S. Department of Education “IPEDS Survey of Degree Completions (multiple editions)”,
Institute of Education Sciences. National Center for Education Statistics. Accessed
August 2013.
U.S. Department of Education “IPEDS Survey of Institutional Characteristics (multiple
editions)”, Institute of Education Sciences. National Center for Education Statistics.
Accessed August 2013.
Wade, James B., Joseph F. Porac, and Timothy G. Pollock. 1997. “Worth, Words, and the
Justification of Executive Pay.” Journal of Organizational Behavior 18 (S1): 641–64.
Wah, Elaine, and Michael P. Wellman. 2013. “Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation,
and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model.” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, 855–72.
Wooldridge J. 2007. “Difference-In-Differences Estimation.” Imbens/Wooldridge, Lecture
Notes 10. What’s New in Econometrics?, NBER.
Wulf, Julie. 2009. “Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market.” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 72 (1): 305–21.
Zipperer Ben, and Skott Peter. 2011. “Cyclical Patterns of Employment, Utilization, and
Profitability.” J. Post Keynesian Econ. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 34 (1): 25–
57.
Zhang, Frank. 2010. “High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery”
Unpublished. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691679

116

